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PANEL I: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, HUMAN RIGHTS JUDGE
Diane Marie Amann*
A cherished moment of my service as a law clerk to the Honorable John
Paul Stevens occurred halfway through the 1988 Term, amid the
Courtroom's marble and mahogany majesty. Early in the week, an
advocate had addressed a robed inquisitor as "Judge," and so provoked a
withering reminder that members of this high bench were "Justices." At
that instant no one said a word. But the scene repeated itself days later.
This time Stevens-who had expressed unease at the first exchange as soon
as he returned to chambers-spoke up: "Excuse me, but if I am not
mistaken, Article III refers to us as judges."
I treasure this moment not because it exposes Stevens's knowledge of the
Constitution-his legal acumen is beyond dispute-but rather because of
what it says about Stevens as a person. Humility, not haughtiness, has
marked his career on the Court. The unwarranted rebukes of nervous
advocates stirred his sympathy, yet did not erase his respect for his peers.
Accordingly, Stevens chose pointed understatement as a means to ease the
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law (Martin Luther King, Jr.
Hall); law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, 1988-1989. A version of
this Article was presented at a symposium on "The Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens," Sept.
30, 2005, at Fordham University School of Law in New York. For guidance on this and
other endeavors over the years, I thank my co-clerks Abner S. Greene, Lewis J. Liman, and
Randolph D. Moss. Thanks as well to Nellie A. Pitts for help and encouragement; to Stuart
Banner, Mary L. Dudziak, Eugene R. Fidell, and Carlton F.W. Larson for comments on this
project as it developed; and to Robert Abiri, Anagha Dandekar Clifford, NaTasha Ralston,
Ryan Walters, and the staff at the Library of Congress's Manuscript Division for research
assistance. This article is dedicated to the Honorable John Paul Stevens, whose imprint on
my life and contributions to the life of the Nation are inexpressible.
1. He was, of course, not mistaken. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (authorizing Congress
to establish courts, then stating that "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office"). This telling is based not on argument transcripts, but rather on my memory of
events I witnessed. See Tony Mauro, Advocate Left Flak Jacket Back in Texas, Legal
Times, Jan. 23, 1989, at 13 (giving a contemporary account of the second exchange, in oral
argument for Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989)); Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Last
Moderate, Am. Law., June 1990, at 48 (reporting on both exchanges); see also Christopher
L. Eisgruber, John Paul Stevens and the Manners of Judging, 1992/1993 Ann. Surv. Am. L.,
at xxx (relating a secondhand version of the story).
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distress of the former without unduly bruising the pride of the latter.2 The
moment illuminates why the title of this Article names Stevens "Judge." It
also sheds some light on why I call him a "human rights judge." So, too, do
other stories that reflect Stevens's fondness for self-effacement: For
example, he is said often to recount that on arrival in Washington he listed
his occupation as "Justice" on a form and so provoked the reply, "OK, last
week, I had a guy who said 'Peace."' 3 There is also the story that Stevens
does not tell but that his clerks do, of the time that Stevens walked into a
Court reception and at once relieved a law clerk of the task another Justice
had assigned her-serving coffee to that Justice and the other men in the
room.4 Still, showing that Stevens is humane does not alone establish that
he is a "human rights" jurist; more explanation of that descriptor is in order.
Much noted in recent years has been the Court's renewed willingness to
consult foreign norms and practices in the course of interpreting the law of
the United States. Various Justices have looked beyond U.S. borders to
construe treaty provisions, as might be expected, 5 but also to bring harmony
to the field of copyright,6 to serve the needs of industry,7 and to confirm the
scope of the constraints that the Constitution places on state action.8 Such
references have triggered a range of reactions: from many international
lawyers, kudos and advice on how to improve the quality of consultation;
2. Stevens reprised this choice each time that he ended a dissent by affirming esteem
for his colleagues. Even as he wrote in one of his most wrenching opinions that the Court's
judgment regarding the 2000 Presidential election had destroyed "the Nation's confidence in
the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law," Stevens concluded with his signature
sentence, "I respectfully dissent." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The adverb was absent in opinions by fellow dissenters, as it often is in other
Justices' dissents.
3. Cliff Sloan, In Praise of John Paul Stevens, MSNBC.com, May 6, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7748622/site/newsweek/1098/.
4. See Eisgruber, supra note 1, at xxx.
5. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) (illustrating debate
among Justices about the significance of judgments from England and Wales on
interpretation of terms in the Warsaw Convention regulating air travel); see also Antonin
Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 Am. Soc'y Int'l
L. Proc. 305, 305 (2004) (stating that "[w]hen federal courts interpret a treaty to which the
United States is a party, they should give considerable respect to the interpretation of the
same treaty by the courts of other signatories").
6. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 196 (2003) (construing a term in a U.S. statute to
correspond with that term's meaning in the European Union).
7. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (supporting a law school's use of
affirmative action to attain a diverse student body, in part because "major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace
can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints" (citing briefs of amici 3M Corp. and General Motors Corp.)).
8. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (finding in foreign sources
"confirmation" of the existence within the United States of a consensus against executing
juveniles) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 12, 56-57, 171, 182, 184-85);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) (sustaining state's law against
assisted suicide after discussing legal prohibitions in Australia, Britain, Canada, Colombia,
and New Zealand).
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from some members of Congress, jurisdiction-limiting legislation and calls
for impeachment.9
Asked to name the Justices at the forefront of the revived use of external
norms, Court watchers on both sides of the debate well might omit mention
of Stevens. While other Justices paid visits to their counterparts abroad and
made speeches in favor of joining an international judicial conversation,10
Stevens seemed silent. In fact, however, Stevens played an essential role.
It was in dissent from a 1988 Stevens opinion discussing foreign law that
Justice Antonin Scalia first sketched the critique that brought the Court's
tradition of consulting external practice to a halt.1  Stevens wrote the
opinion that resumed the practice after a thirteen-year hiatus, and he figured
in two subsequent decisions that entrenched it.12 Finally, he spoke out
against attacks on consultation, both in a separate opinion and in a speech to
Midwestern jurists.' 3 Stevens's role in these cases was in keeping with a
longstanding willingness to consider global context-not in every case, but
when the particular circumstances so warrant.
This Article investigates the nature and reasons for this. First it discusses
certain "Stevensean" jurisprudence-if I may coin a term that honors the
Justice's favorite bardl 4-specifically, jurisprudence that considers
9. In support of the practice, see, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World
Order 102 (2004) (seeing "cross-fertilization of legal cultures" through judicial interactions
as essential "to build a world under law"). In opposition, see, for example, H.R. J. Res. 97,
109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (objecting, in a draft resolution expressly triggered by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), to judicial consultation of foreign law unless
consistent with "original meaning of the Constitution of the United States"); Tom Curry, A
flap over foreign matter at the Supreme Court: House members protest use of non-U.S.
rulings in big cases, MSNBC.com, Mar. 11, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232
(reporting the statement of U.S. Rep. Tom Feeney (R.-Fla.) that, should such a resolution
pass, judges who disregarded it would invite the "ultimate remedy, which would be
impeachment").
10. See Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer, Judges in Contemporary Democracy: An
International Conversation (2004); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders:
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 Yale L. & Pol'y
Rev. 329, 330 (2004) (stressing "the value I place on comparative dialogue"); Sandra Day
O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 35, 41 (1996) ("Just as
our domestic laws develop through a free exchange of ideas among state and federal courts,
so too should international law evolve through a dialogue between national courts and
transnational tribunals and through the interdependent effect of their judgments."); cf
Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could
Change the Supreme Court, The New Yorker, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42 (giving an account of
Kennedy's support for consultation, based on interviews given in summer 2005).
11. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 859 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); discussion infra text accompanying notes 20-29,
171, 184-86.
12. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); discussion infra text accompanying notes
51-57, 171, 182, 185-86.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 57-59.
14. See John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1373 (1992); Who wrote Shakespeare? The Moot Court Debate on the
Authorship of Shakespeare's Works, http://www.shakespeare-oxford.com/mootcour.htm
(last visited Jan. 19, 2006) (depicting Stevens and two colleagues, Justices William J.
1571
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
international context in determining the degree to which the U.S.
Constitution constrains criminal law enforcement. The discussion shows
that Stevens has pursued a path of selective receptivity to consulting foreign
sources and to applying the Constitution in matters with overseas
implications; however, he has offered scant explanation of why he is
receptive or what circumstances cause him to consider foreign context. In
search of answers to those questions, this Article looks to a period of
Stevens's life that as yet has received little attention; that is, the mid-
twentieth century, during which he came of age as a man and as a lawyer.
Scholars have found in World War II and its aftermath clues to doctrinal
shifts that led the Court to do right by civil rights and rights of the accused;
specifically, to enforce against both federal and state governments the
Constitution's guarantees that all will receive equal protection of the laws
and that none will be deprived of liberty without due process of law. 15
Stevens lived that era, as a naval officer, as a law student, as a law clerk to
Supreme Court Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, and as a lawyer. It seems
elementary that the formation of Stevens the young man in an era of great
global change would have had an effect on the thinking of Stevens the
Justice.
This discussion of Stevens at mid-century relies primarily on
examination of the Rutledge Papers on file at the Library of Congress and
on a brief phone conversation with Stevens. 16 No historian will be
surprised to learn that this limited research has not resolved unequivocally
why the Justice has proved receptive to consideration of international
context. But the research did contribute some pieces to that puzzle. It
revealed, for example, that an incident during the young naval officer's
service as a codebreaker planted concerns about capital punishment, a
salient issue throughout the career of the Justice. 17 Cases that worked their
way through the Rutledge chambers counseled vigilance-particularly in
time of global conflict-against executive encroachments on judges' duty
to protect the rights of detained or convicted persons. 18 In one case, law
Brennan and Harry A. Blackmun, presiding at the Sept. 25, 1987, debate described in David
Lloyd Kreeger, In Re Shakespeare: The Authorship of Shakespeare on Trial, 37 Am. U. L.
Rev. 609 (1988)).
15. The Constitution states, "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1; see also id. amend. V (using identical
language, and requiring the federal government to afford due process to "any person");
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (finding in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause a duty on the part of the federal government to afford equal protection). For
scholarship regarding the effect of global developments on mid-century U.S. jurisprudence,
see infra text accompanying notes 87, 161, 179, 194, 196.
16. Wiley Rutledge Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C. [hereinafter Rutledge Papers]; Telephone Interview with Justice John Paul Stevens
(June 22, 2005) [hereinafter JPS Interview]. In citations to correspondence throughout this
article, Stevens is designated "JPS"; Rutledge, "WBR."
17. See infra text accompanying notes 68-78.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 118-35; cf Norman Dorsen, John Paul Stevens,
1992/1993 Ann. Surv. Am. L., at xxvi (acknowledging the "risk" of"highlight[ing] any one
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clerk Stevens advised-fully six years before the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education-that segregation be ruled unconstitutional.19
These incidents afford tentative answers to the question of the Justice's
selective receptivity to foreign context. Stevens's experiences offered the
real-time lesson that much of what is considered external law-in
particular, norms enforced within regional and international human rights
systems-is not really external at all. To a great extent it is the progeny of
American legal traditions of fundamental rights and due process, and it is to
that extent alone that Stevens has looked to such sources. These norms are,
moreover, the product of a time in which the United States endeavored to
lead the world by example. During World War II, Stevens himself
shouldered a bit of the burden that attended U.S. leadership. The Navy
officer's awareness of that burden may help to explain some of the Justice's
views-not only why he has paid some heed to foreign judges in the course
of constitutional interpretation, for example, but also why he has accorded
to foreigners abroad some of the protections of that Constitution. In short,
it is not some fascination with the foreign that explains Stevens's
receptivity. It is, rather, his enduring quest to uphold American values, at
home and abroad.
I. STEVENSEAN JURISPRUDENCE AND FOREIGN CONTEXT
Examination of selected matters that reached the Court in the last two
decades reveals the contours of Justice Stevens's jurisprudence in cases
with transnational import.
A. Consultation and Constitutional Interpretation
Early in the 1987 Term, Justices heard argument in Thompson v.
Oklahoma, a matter from America's heartland not only because of its place
of origin, but also because its facts involved the bloodthirst and brutality
that are tragically familiar in capital cases. 20 Ordinarily there would have
been no claim that capital punishment-permitted within bounds set out
eleven years earlier in an opinion by Justices Potter Stewart, Lewis E.
Powell, and John Paul Stevens 21-was excessive. But this was no ordinary
case. Petitioner, fifteen years old at the time of the murder, sought a ruling
influence on what a justice writes," yet "suggest[ing] that John Paul Stevens was shaped in
large part by his clerkship with Justice Wiley Rutledge").
19. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), to hold that maintenance of
separate but equal facilities is inherently unequal, so that racial segregation of public schools
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
20. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 819-21 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Stevens,
J.) (describing the facts in the case argued Nov. 9, 1987); id at 859-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(same); cf Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94-96 (1996) (explaining the concept of
"heartland" as descriptive of a typical criminal case).
21. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158-207 (1976). On Gregg and consequent
decisions, see generally James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less is Better: Justice
Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1607, 1619-48 (2006).
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that his execution would amount to unconstitutionally cruel and unusual
punishment. 22 Months later, - on the last day of the Term, petitioner
prevailed. Stevens's opinion for the plurality restated that, to interpret the
Eighth Amendment, the Court looked to "the 'evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"' as determined from
both "the work product of state legislatures and sentencing juries" and "the
reasons why a civilized society may accept or reject the death penalty in
certain types of cases." 23  Having shown a state legislative consensus
against the penalty under review, Stevens cited foreign practice and
multilateral treaties and wrote that to conclude "that it would offend
civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16
years old at the time of his or her offense" was "consistent with the views"
of "other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage" and of "the
leading members of the Western European community. '24
Stevens's reference to external norms was both in keeping with prior
decisions and supported by a Library of Congress survey.25 It provoked
protest nevertheless. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent for three members of
the Court argued that to rely on an account of "civilized standards of
decency in other countries is totally inappropriate as a means of
establishing the fundamental beliefs of this Nation." 26  A domestic
consensus in favor of execution ought to control "even if that position
contradicts the uniform view of the rest of the world," Scalia insisted,
adding, "We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States
of America that we are expounding."27 A year later, a majority of the Court
agreed: World opinion was dismissed in the first footnote of a judgment
holding that the Constitution permitted the death penalty for children over
22. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-19 & n.1 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.); see U.S.
Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
23. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821-22 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.) (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J.)). Three Justices agreed
with Stevens that application of this formula compelled a categorical ban. Id. at 821
(reporting joinder by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
concurred in the judgment on a narrower ground. Id. at 848-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 830, 831 n.34 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.) (citing inter alia Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Annex, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 68, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]).
25. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 n.31 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.) (stating that in Trop
and other Eighth Amendment decisions, the Court had "recognized the relevance of the
views of the international community"); id. at 830-33 & n.34 (discussing external norms and
practice, based on information in a survey and amicus brief).
26. Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and White, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
27. Id. (invoking, without citation, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407
(1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (writing that "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding")).
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fifteen, and was not discussed at all in a same-day judgment permitting
execution of mentally retarded persons. 28  Scalia assured an academic
audience that, with these decisions, consultation of foreign law had been
"retired." 29
B. Law Enforcement at Home and Abroad
The Court did not retreat from all consideration of foreign concerns. To
the contrary, transnational expansion of U.S. law enforcement compelled
the Court repeatedly to ask to what extent the Constitution applies overseas.
Most Justices answered, "Not much." The Court held in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez that introduction of evidence which U.S. agents had
obtained in a warrantless search of a noncitizen defendant's home in
Mexico would not transgress the ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures; 30 in United States v. Alvarez-Machain that due process did not
forbid the United States from arranging to kidnap a defendant abroad in
order to hale him into court on charges of murdering a federal agent;31 and
in United States v. Balsys that, notwithstanding the privilege against self-
incrimination, a court could compel testimony in a U.S. immigration
proceeding even though it might be used against the witness in a foreign
prosecution. 32
As is his wont, Stevens filed a separate opinion in each case; 33 in so
doing, he evinced a contextual approach to the question of the
Constitution's extraterritorial reach. Stevens rejected the statement in
Verdugo-Urquidez that the noncitizen before the bar was not "among those
'people' who are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights," yet held
against him on the ground that "American magistrates have no power"
under the Constitution to issue warrants applicable outside of the United
28. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (criticizing
dissenters' discussion of other countries' rejection of the juvenile death penalty); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (omitting mention of foreign context in reviewing a death
sentence imposed despite evidence that the petitioner suffered from mental retardation).
29. Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 St. Louis U. L.J. 1119, 1121 (1996). For further
discussion of consultation in this period, see generally Diane Marie Amann, International
Law and Rehnquist-Era Reversals, 94 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
30. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (interpreting U.S. Const.
amend. IV).
31. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
32. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (interpreting U.S. Const. amend. V)
("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.").
33. Stevens's readiness to write separately reflects the value he places on transparency
in judicial decision making-a value reinforced by his 1969 experience investigating
corruption in the Illinois judiciary, an incident that might have been uncovered earlier if a
state Justice had not declined to publish a draft dissent. John Paul Stevens, Foreword to
Kenneth A. Manaster, Illinois Justice, at xii (2001) ("If there is disagreement within an
appellate court about how a case should be resolved, I firmly believe that the law will best be
served by an open disclosure of that fact, not only to the litigants and other lawyers, but to
the public as well.").
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States.34  Stevens concurred in Balsys as well. He reasoned that "[t]he
primary office" of the Self-Incrimination Clause "is to afford protection to
persons whose liberty has been placed in jeopardy in an American
tribunal," and compulsion of testimony subject only to use abroad "will not
have any adverse impact on the fairness of American criminal trials."'35
For Stevens the kidnapping for trial of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain
did compromise American justice, and he dissented with vigor. Stevens's
article-by-article analysis of the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty-read in
light of the U.N. Charter and other international law designed to prevent
one country's "violation of the territorial integrity" of another-undercut
the majority's conclusion that the treaty contained no implicit ban on
forcible abduction. 36 Stevens further refuted the premise that the case was
controlled by a century-old holding that due process had not been violated
by the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a defendant whom a bounty
hunter kidnapped overseas. The issue at bar was not private conduct,
Stevens stressed, but rather action by a government that had no lawful
authority so to act. 37 Though it was understandable that U.S. agents would
have wanted to avenge the death of their comrade, "it is precisely at such
moments that we should remember and be guided by our duty 'to render
judgment evenly and dispassionately according to law,"' Stevens wrote.38
Mindful that what the United States does "in a case of this kind sets an
example that other tribunals in other countries are sure to emulate," Stevens
concluded with a call to caution that Thomas Paine had sounded 200 years
earlier: "'He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his
enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a
precedent that will reach to himself.' 39
34. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (taking
issue with id. at 265 (Rehnquist, C.J.)); cf Diane Marie Amann, Guantnamo, 42 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 263, 292-99 (2004) (analyzing the precedential weight of Rehnquist's
statement respecting the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to noncitizens).
35. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 700 (Stevens, J., concurring). Conversely, Stevens added that he
did "not believe our Bill of Rights was intended to have any effect on the conduct of foreign
proceedings." Id. at 701.
36. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 670-81 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun and
O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (citing U.N. Charter; Charter of the Organization of American
States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OAS Charter]; 1
Oppenheim's International Law 295 & n.1 (8th ed. 1955) (setting forth customary
international law)).
37. Id. at 682 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that reliance on Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436 (1886), "fails to differentiate between the conduct of private citizens, which does not
violate any treaty obligation, and conduct expressly authorized by the Executive Branch of
the Government, which unquestionably constitutes a flagrant violation of international law,
and in my opinion, also constitutes a breach of our treaty obligations").
38. Id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258, 342 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
39. Id. at 688 (quoting 2 The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 588 (Philip S. Foner
ed., 1945)); see also id. (approving of 1991 South African decision that relied on Ker and
other U.S. precedents in the course of dismissing the prosecution of a defendant whom
governmental agents had abducted in a foreign country). On remand, the defendant stood
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C. Constitutional Border Crossings
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, etched into high relief the
challenge of securing liberty while fighting an enemy. The U.S. executive
soon chose to subject persons-many noncitizens plus a couple of
Americans whom it unilaterally designated "enemy combatants"-to
indefinite, incommunicado detention and interrogation at sites in the United
States, at the U.S. military base at Guantdnamo, and elsewhere throughout
the world. At the end of its 2003 Term, the Court established in Rasul v.
Bush that aliens held offshore were entitled to petition U.S. courts, and in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that courts must undertake meaningful review of the
lawfulness of detention.40 Justices offered disparate rationales in the ten
separate opinions filed in Rasul, Hamdi, and a companion case, Rumsfeld v.
Padilla;4 in each, Stevens made his own viewpoint clear.
Stevens's opinion for five members of the Court in Rasul-brought by
two Australians and twelve Kuwaitis held at Guantdnamo-grounded
decision in the tradition of habeas corpus, "'a writ antecedent to statute, ...
throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law' well before the
framers enshrined it in the Constitution of 1789.42 Stevens discussed mid-
twentieth century opinions that confirmed the writ's core purpose of putting
a stop to executive detention without judicial review, and he noted that the
Court had heard habeas petitions in times of war, even, in the case of
Japan's General Tomoyuki Yamashita, petitions from noncitizens in U.S.
custody overseas.43 A 1950 precedent did not preclude relief, Stevens
wrote, because it hinged on the 1948 statutory interpretation in Ahrens v.
Clark, since overruled. 44 Stevens thus applied the statute to detainees at the
trial and was acquitted of all charges. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698-99
(2004) (finding, in respondent's civil suit, no basis for relief under U.S. law).
40. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see
also Amann, supra note 34, at 266-85 (discussing the development of the executive
detention policy and domestic and extranational litigation predating Supreme Court review).
41. 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2085, 2096-98, 2126-31 (2005) (analyzing the Court's detention trilogy).
42. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473-74 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ.) (quoting Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945)) (citing U.S. Const.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.")) (alteration in
original).
43. Id. at 474 (quoting inter alia Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in the result) ("The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by
executive authorities without judicial trial."); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that "[e]xecutive
imprisonment has been considered oppressive and lawless" since the time of Magna Carta of
1215, and that the English judiciary "developed the writ of habeas corpus" to keep
individual rights free from "executive restraint")); see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475 (citing
inter alia In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)).
44. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-79 (discussing the interrelation of Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950), and Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), the latter overruled by
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973)); cf id. at 485-88
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Eisentrager applied, but interpreting
it to conclude that Guantdnamo petitions should go forward).
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Guantdnamo base, over which the United States "exercises 'complete
jurisdiction and control,"' notwithstanding its location in Cuba.45 Turning
from habeas to detainees' civil suits, he wrote that no case law
"categorically excludes aliens detained in military custody outside the
United States from the privilege of litigation in U.S. courts."
46
Although the Court had confined Rasul to the question of jurisdiction,
Stevens's opinion indicated that, if proved, allegations that innocent
noncitizens were enduring at Guantdnamo prolonged executive detention
without charges or access to lawyers "unquestionably" would establish
violations of U.S. laws. 47 His position with respect to the two citizens held
in the United States was even more adamant. In Hamdi, Stevens joined a
dissent in which Scalia contended that, even in times of emergency, unless
Congress suspends the writ of habeas corpus, the executive may not detain
an American suspected of making war against the United States except
according to the constraints of the criminal justice system.48 Joined by
three Justices, Stevens condemned the majority in Padilla for interposing a
procedural obstacle to avoid "our duty" to consider the "questions of
profound importance to the Nation" that the case posed.49 In a passage that
echoed his earlier evocation of Thomas Paine, Stevens expressed concern
lest the Court's refusal to examine petitioner's detention condone executive
interrogations reminiscent of the Star Chamber: "[I]f this Nation is to
remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools
of tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny." 50
Stevens's position in the detention trilogy rested almost exclusively on
the domestic law of habeas corpus and due process. Yet in other decisions
from the same period, Stevens was influential in reviving the consultation
of foreign norms and practice to aid determination of the meaning of "due
process" and other open-textured constitutional terms.
Breakthrough came in 2002, when the Court in Atkins v. Virginia
overruled thirteen-year-old precedent to hold that the execution of mentally
retarded offenders is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. 51  Stevens's
45. Id. at 480 (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Feb.
23, 1903, T.S. No. 418).
46. Id. at 484 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
47. Id. at 483 n.15; see also Amann, supra note 34, at 281 (quoting the single question
on which the Court granted certiorari).
48. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-79 (2004) (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J.)
(interpreting U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, quoted supra note 42).
49. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 455 (2004) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
50. Id. at 465. Compare id. with United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 688
(1992) (quoting 2 The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, supra note 39).
51. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989)). In the interim, Stevens had cited foreign jurisprudence in support of his position
that whether the law permitted execution of someone who had served a prolonged time on
death row was a question of sufficient "importance and novelty ... to warrant review."
Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting denial
of certiorari) (discussing two Privy Council judgments). To date, the Court never has
granted certiorari on that question.
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opinion for the Court focused on domestic indicators of standards of
decency; that is, on a state legislative trend against such executions, on the
scarcity of such executions, and on an "independent" judgment that such
executions do not "measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive
purpose of the death penalty. ' 52 In a footnote citing an amicus brief from
the European Union, Stevens added: "Moreover, within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved. '53 Dissenters
objected to the majority's return to consultation, 54 but to no avail. In 2003,
a five-member majority discussed decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights in the course of holding that due process bars criminal
prosecution of same-sex sodomy, 55 and in 2005 the same majority
discussed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, other
human rights treaties, and foreign practice as it overruled precedent to hold
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of anyone younger than
eighteen at the time of his or her crime. 56
Each of the latter two decisions was written by Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, presumably pursuant to an assignment from Stevens. When
Kennedy drew fire for his use of foreign law, Stevens came to his aid.
Stevens's short concurrence in the 2005 case welcomed the majority's
"reaffirmation" of the "evolving standards of decency" principle, and
asserted that if Alexander Hamilton were alive, he would join Kennedy's
opinion, as did Stevens, "without hesitation. '57 In a speech before the
Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference soon after, Stevens criticized "a mass
mailing suggesting that I should be impeached" on account of that joinder:
It does seem to me, however, that there is a vast difference between, on
the one hand, considering the thoughtful views of other scholars and
judges-whether they be Americans or foreigners and whether they be
state judges, federal judges or judges sitting in other countries-before
making up our own minds, and, on the other hand, treating international
52. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-27 (Stevens, J, joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
53. Id. at 316-17 n.21 (citing Brief for European Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 4, id. (No. 00-8452)).
54. Id. at 322-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting); id. at
347-48 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
55. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-77 (2003) (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (outlining the 1981 judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981), and observing
that, since then, that court and "[o]ther nations, too, have taken action consistent with an
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
conduct").
56. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-78 (2005) (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (citing inter alia U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; American Convention, supra note 24, art.
4(5); ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 6(5); Criminal Justice Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58 (U.K.)).
See generally Amann, supra note 29 (detailing consultation in this period).
57. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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opinion as controlling our interpretation of our own law. We should not
be impeached for the former; we are not guilty of the latter.
58
Stevens added, "'Our system is the role model for the world.' 59 It was a
declaration based squarely on the Justice's own life experience.
II. A PORTRAIT OF THE JUSTICE AS A YOUNG MAN
Born April 20, 1920, into the family that built the Chicago hotel now
known as the Hilton, young John Stevens met the international celebrities
of the Roaring Twenties: Amelia Earhart scolded him for being out late on
a school night, and Charles Lindbergh, just back from his landmark solo
flight to Paris, gave the boy a dove.60 A South Side Cubs fan, Stevens sat
in the stands at Wrigley Field as slugger Babe Ruth, with two strikes
against him, pointed to center field and hit a home run to put the Yankees
ahead in Game Three of the 1932 World Series. 61 Several years later,
Stevens listened as two of his University of Chicago professors, Mortimer
Adler and Robert Hutchins, debated whether the United States should come
to the aid of England in its fight against Nazi Germany.62 The Phi Beta
Kappa graduate had just begun master's degree studies in English literature
when a dean encouraged him to take a correspondence course in military
encoding and decoding. 63
A. World War 11 Codebreaker
On completion of the codes course, Stevens received a commission as an
officer in the U.S. Navy. He took his physical at Great Lakes Naval Base
on December 6, 1941. Hours later, of course, Japanese kamikazes bombed
Pearl Harbor.64 The surprise assault on the Pacific fleet propelled the
58. John Paul Stevens, Justice Stevens Remarks, Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference
Dinner 2, 8 (May 23, 2005) (on file with author).
59. Id. at 8-9 (quoting U.S. District Judge Joan Lefkow, who had spoken just before
him).
60. John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States,
Biographical Data, 1992/1993 Ann. Surv. Am. L., at lv [hereinafter Biographical Data]
(listing birthdate); Glen Elsasser, Say... Who Was That Bridge Life Master, Anyway?, Chi.
Trib., Nov. 26, 1998, at 1. Stevens, who later became a private pilot, provided a glimpse of
that raucous era in Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1909 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing his "understanding (and recollection) of the historical context" of the amendment
that ended Prohibition, a time when "millions of Americans" did not consider "alcohol...
an ordinary article of commerce," but rather "condemned the use of the 'demon rum"').
61. See Eric Enders, 1903-2004: 100 Years of the World Series 79 (2005) (describing
the game); Elsasser, supra note 60 (mentioning Stevens's attendance); Oyez, Justice John
Paul Stevens' Chambers, http://www.oyez.org/oyez/tour/stevenschamber-from-introduction
(last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (depicting framed print of Ruth's feat and scorecard from that
game, both displayed in the Justice's chambers). Long afterward, Stevens threw the first
pitch at the same ballpark. See photo accompanying Tom Curry, Justice Stevens is key to
high court's future, MSNBC.com, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9408518/.
62. John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1561, 1561 (2006).
63. See Manaster, supra note 33, at 38; Biographical Data, supra note 60, at Iv.
64. JPS Interview, supra note 16; see Manaster, supra note 33, at 38 ("Eventually
Stevens couldn't resist joking that his enlistment apparently had precipitated the war.").
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United States into the world war already raging for years in Asia, Europe,
and Africa. Thus that date of infamy, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt
famously called it,65 had been proceeded by many others. The full extent of
the Holocaust that claimed millions of persons-Jews, Poles, Slavs,
Gypsies, homosexuals, and others against whom Hitler had railed-would
not be revealed until after the war's end.66 Nonetheless, by 1941, everyone
knew of the Nazis' conquests of continental Europe and consequent
impressment of the conquered into forced labor, of the 1935 Nuremberg
law that oppressed persons it defined as Jews, and of the 1937-1938 Rape
of Nanking, during which many thousands of Chinese suffered sexual
assault and other brutality at the hands of Japanese invaders.67
"I went to Pearl in December 1942," Stevens recalled much later, "and
stayed there almost until the end of the war." 68 He was a codebreaker, a
member of a global team of "unlikely warriors" 69 whose labors have been
described in heroic terms:
[H]ollow-eyed, unshaven cryptologists or photo reconnaissance analysts
deep in a basement or windowless room, surrounded by the clack of IBM
sorters and tabulator machines or the stench of darkroom chemicals-it
was men (and women) of this sort who were the intelligence aces of
World War II. Far from the fighting fronts, in Pearl Harbor, Melbourne,
New Delhi, and Washington, small groups of seldom-seen, overburdened,
relentlessly driven men and women labored over the greatest intelligence
feat of the war: the recovery, decryption, and analysis of coded
messages. 70
65. See Pearl Harbor-FDR's Day of Infamy Speech, http://www.umkc.edu/lib/spec-
col/ww2/PearlHarbor/fdr-speech.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006) (including photos, an audio
clip, and a typescript facsimile of his Dec. 8, 1941, speech to Congress in which Roosevelt
named the attack "a date which will live in infamy").
66. See Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 21-24, 103 (1992)
(reviewing the persecution of Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, and Poles); Diane Marie Amann, Group
Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 Int'l Crim. L. Rev. 93, 96-97 (2002) (summarizing
a description of atrocities in Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), and
Lemkin's linkage of those crimes to Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Reynal & Hitchcock ed.,
1939)); Arthur L. Berney, Revisiting a Conference Commemorating the Nuremberg Trials:
A Commentary from a Nuremberg Prosecutor, 17 B.C. Third World L.J. 275, 275 (1997)
(discussing the persecution of homosexuals, Gypsies, and others); see also Taylor, supra, at
26 (admitting that the author, though an Army officer, "did not become aware of the
Holocaust until my exposure to the relevant documents and witnesses at Nuremberg," and
citing a "comparable avowal" in George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern 63 (1982)).
67. See, e.g., Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War
11 (1998) (describing atrocities in Nanjing, China); Taylor, supra note 66, at 21, 340, 457,
560 (discussing the Nuremberg laws and later, similar measures in occupied countries); id. at
24 (referring to reports "[i]n the wake of the Nazi conquests of 1940 and 1941" of "the
roundup of millions of men and women from all the occupied countries for forced labor on
German farms and in German mines and factories").
68. JPS Interview, supra note 16; see also Manaster, supra note 33, at 38.
69. Donald A. Davis, Lightning Strike: The Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto
and Avenge Pearl Harbor 91 (2005).
70. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun 445 (1985), quoted in Carroll V. Glines,
Attack on Yamamoto 13-14 (1991) (stating further that "almost all of the messages flashed
between the top Japanese naval units and their leaders after Pearl Harbor were intercepted
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Stevens was awarded a Bronze Star for his service. "I did a lot of work
breaking a particular cipher," he explained. "It involved call signals. It was
very technical." '71
One event days before Stevens's twenty-third birthday would stay with
him for the rest of his life. The architect of the Pearl Harbor attack was
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who had learned English from a missionary
and become a Babe Ruth fan while studying at Harvard in the 1920s.72 On
April 14, 1943, Americans discovered that Yamamoto was about to travel
to the front. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, Stevens explained in an
interview more than sixty years later, "We had broken the code." 73  On
Roosevelt's orders, U.S. pilots downed Yamamoto's plane over a Solomon
Islands jungle on April 18, Easter Sunday. 74 "I was on duty on the day they
brought the plane down," Stevens said, "The message was, 'We bagged one
eagle and two sparrows,' indicating success in the mission." The kill
buoyed the spirits of many, who knew that getting Yamamoto would, as
Stevens put it, "have a tremendous strategic advantage."
But the incident troubled the young officer. "I remember thinking that
the planners must have engaged in a lot of deliberation before deciding to
go along with the plan," Stevens said. "I have read a number of books on it
since and discovered that was not the case. They were concerned that
targeting him would reveal that they had broken the code." Accounts of the
killing indicate that U.S. Admiral Chester A. Nimitz and others-in
communications laced with foxhunting terms75-- debated only the tactical
benefits and costs. 76 "But they had no humanitarian concerns at all of the
and read by the U.S. Navy's outstanding codebreakers," and calling "[t]heir work,
unheralded and still mostly classified.... the secret weapon that could be said to have won
the war in the Pacific").
71. JPS Interview, supra note 16. Roosevelt established the Bronze Star Medal for
award to a service member who "on or after December 7, 1941, distinguishes, or has
distinguished, himself by heroic or meritorious achievement or service, not involving
participation in aerial flight, in connection with military or naval operations against an
enemy of the United States." Exec. Order No. 9419, 9 Fed. Reg. 1495 (Feb. 8, 1944).
72. See Davis, supra note 69, at 36-39.
73. All Stevens quotes respecting the Yamamoto incident are from JPS Interview, supra
note 16; see Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy
370-74 (John Bester trans., 1979) (indicating that the Japanese did not suspect codes had
been broken until after the strike against Yamamoto); Davis, supra note 69, at 91-93
(discussing breaking of Japanese code); Glines, supra note 70, at 20-25 (same).
74. See Agawa, supra note 73, at 344-68 (providing an account of the killing of
Yamamoto); Davis, supra note 69, at 257-302 (describing the U.S. mission); Glines, supra
note 70, at 57-111, 149-50 (giving U.S. and Japanese accounts of events, relating
Roosevelt's authorization, and noting that the date was Easter).
75. See Glines, supra note 70, at 6-8 (writing that Admiral William F. Halsey,
Commander, South Pacific, sent subordinates a wire that ended "COMMENT: TALLEYHO
X LET'S GET THE BASTARD X," and that later Nimitz wired Halsey, "BEST OF LUCK
AND HAPPY HUNTING").
76. See Agawa, supra note 73, at 370 ("What Nimitz feared in reality was that the
operation would reveal to the Japanese the truth about American code-breaking activities.");
Davis, supra note 69, at 228-29, 289-90 (discussing concerns around which the debate over
whether to target Yamamoto centered); Glines, supra note 70, at 4-5 (recounting a
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kind that troubled me," Stevens said. That fact "kind of surprised me," he
continued, particularly given that Yamamoto "had spent time in the United
States and had friendships among high-ranking American officers. 77
Appearing before the Chicago Bar Association decades later, Stevens
alluded to the event without naming the target. The Justice told his
audience that the experience had sown doubts in his mind about another
instance in which the state takes the life of a named individual; that is,
capital punishment. Recalling that talk, Stevens affirmed that the
Yamamoto incident led him to conclude that "[t]he targeting of a particular
individual with the intent to kill him was a lot different than killing a soldier
in battle and dealing with a statistic.... In my mind, there is a difference
between statistics and sitting on a jury and deciding whether to kill a single
person."78
B. Postwar Law Student
In 1945, Stevens enrolled at his father's alma mater, Northwestern
University School of Law, on the G.I. Bill.79 Two years later, he graduated
magna cum laude, having set the school record for highest grade point
average.80
Stevens's law studies took place at a time of monumental postwar
reconstruction and realignment. A month after the attack on Pearl Harbor,
the United States and its European allies had taken a first step toward an
international organization, a global security regime designed to deter
nation-states' abuses of force.81 As Stevens readied to enter law school,
fifty countries adopted the Charter of that United Nations organization at a
conference in San Francisco. 82  Then, on October 6, 1945, Allied
prosecutors lodged with the newly established International Military
conversation in which Nimitz and an aide, mulling whether "'to try to get' Yamamoto,
spoke only of tactical considerations).
77. See Davis, supra note 69, at 228, 289-90 (stating that a U.S. intelligence officer had
gone to a "duck-netting party" as Yamamoto's guest, and also "played bridge and watched
kabuki" with him); Glines, supra note 70, at 4-5 (referring to Yamamoto's hosting of a 1937
duck hunt at the emperor's game preserve).
78. JPS Interview, supra note 16. Stevens's talk appears to have been reported only in a
bar newsletter, which I read at the time but did not keep.
79. Manaster, supra note 33, at 38 (writing that the "G.I. Bill mostly pa[id] his way");
John Paul Stevens, Introductory Comment, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 977, 977 (1981) (stating that
his father studied law at Northwestern in 1906).
80. See George W. Gekas, U.S. House of Representatives, Tribute to U.S. Supreme
Court Associate Justice John Paul Stevens, reprinted in 142 Cong. Rec. E1450 (daily ed.
Aug. 1, 1996).
81. See Declaration by the United Nations, Jan. 1, 1942, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade03.htm (containing the pledge of twenty-
six "United Nations" to fight the Axis Powers in order "to defend life, liberty, independence
and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as
in other lands"); Taylor, supra note 66, at 26 n.1 (stating that by this declaration "[t]he
United Nations alliance was formally established").
82. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New 3-20 (2001) (tracing
developments leading to the approval of the U.N. Charter).
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Tribunal an indictment charging twenty-four Nazi leaders with crimes
against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.83 Trial soon began
in what proved to be the first of many war crimes proceedings in Europe
and in Asia.84 But the alliance frayed even as the joint trials proceeded. In
the spring of Stevens's first year of law school, former British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill declared that "an iron curtain has descended
across the Continent," dividing Europe into democratic and Communist
halves. 85 A year later, President Harry S. Truman proclaimed that the
United States would "support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation," and Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced a
comprehensive plan "to assist in the return of normal economic health in
the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured
peace." 86 The waging abroad of a Cold War made imperative, to borrow a
trope from Professor Mary L. Dudziak, enforcement at home of individual
rights and racial equality. 87
These developments were reflected in the pages of Northwestern's law
review, of which Stevens was a co-editor-in-chief. During his tenure, the
83. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945,
59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (authorizing tribunal); Taylor, supra note 66, at 78-149
(detailing the drafting and contents of the first indictment).
84. See Opening Statement of Justice Jackson (Nov. 21, 1945), in Int'l Military
Tribunal, 2 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 99-
155 (1948) [hereinafter Jackson Opening]; see also United States v. Goering, 6 F.R.D. 69
(1946) (Int'l Mil. Tribunal, 1946) (setting forth the judgment of the International Military
Trib., delivered Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 1946). Trials continued in Europe for a number of years
thereafter. See Germany (Territory Under Allied Occupation: U.S. Zone), Trials of War
Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10
(1949-53); Taylor, supra note 66, at 640. There were trials in Asia as well, before special
U.S. military commissions operating pursuant to congressional enactment, and before an
international tribunal operating pursuant to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East at Tokyo, Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers at Tokyo, April 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20. See Richard H. Minear,
Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1971).
85. Winston S. Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, Speech Delivered at Westminster
College, Fulton, Mo. (Mar. 5, 1946), in VII Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches
1897-1963, at 7285, 7290 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974).
86. Harry S. Truman, President, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress (Mar. 12,
1947), available at http://www.yale.eduilawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm; see also Text of the
Marshall Plan Speech (June 4, 1947), available at George C. Marshall Foundation, The
Marshall Plan, http://www.marshallfoundation.org/marshallplan-speechharvard.html
(State Department handout).
87. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 61
(1988) [hereinafter Dudziak, Desegregation] (demonstrating the relation between changes in
the racial policy and the changing global status of the United States); see also Mary L.
Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy 252 (2000)
(writing that "[w]hile it provided leverage for social change, the Cold War imperative was
never static," but rather benefited from and helped to generate "international interest" in "the
narrative of race in America"). See generally Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism:
Translating the Guarantees of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1193
(1998); Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar
Constitutional Thought, 106 Yale L.J. 423 (1996).
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review published not only an article on impediments to post-conviction
relief for Illinois prisoners denied their right to a fair trial, but also three
lectures on postwar challenges, each delivered by a statesman working to
promote international peace and democracy. 88 Among them was Adlai E.
Stevenson, an Illinoisan who had served as special assistant to the Secretary
of the Navy, as press liaison at the San Francisco Conference establishing
the United Nations, and as senior advisor to the U.S. delegation at the first
meeting of the U.N. General Assembly.89
The Northwestern faculty decided to sponsor Stevens and his counterpart
for clerkships with Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson and Justice Wiley B.
Rutledge. "It was in the Law Review office," Stevens later wrote, that the
two top editors "flipped a coin to determine which vacancy each would
seek."90 The results of that toss led Northwestern Professor W. Willard
Wirtz to recommend Stevens to Rutledge in a letter whose terms well
exceeded glowing. "Let me simply say that I consider Stevens to be one of
the two most outstanding students whom I have ever worked with," Wirtz
wrote his longtime colleague and friend, adding, "I know that this must
sound like exaggerated praise, and yet it is literally true." 91  Wirtz
continued,
Stevens has the quickest, and at the same time best balanced, mind I
have ever seen at work in a classroom.... The man is just as solid as he
is brilliant. Beyond all this he has a personality which makes it a pure
delight to work with him. I suppose that he is undoubtedly the most
admired, and at the same time, the best liked man in school.92
Wirtz concluded with the "hope that your plans will work out so that you
can take advantage of Steven's abilities and that he may, at the same time,
enjoy what I should consider the finest single opportunity that any man
could possibly have." 93  Rutledge extended the opportunity. Stevens
88. See Stevens, supra note 79, at 977 (stating that he was co-editor for issues two and
three of Volume 42 of what was then called the Illinois Law Review, in which appeared
Philip C. Jessup, The International Court of Justice and Legal Matters, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 273
(1947); Joseph E. Johnson, The Security Council in the United Nations, 42 I11. L. Rev. 192
(1947); Adlai E. Stevenson, Some Post-War Reflections, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 292 (1947));
Comment, Collateral Relieffrom Convictions in Violation of Due Process in Illinois, 42 Ill.
L. Rev. 329 (1947).
89. Stevenson, supra note 88, at n.*; see John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson of
Illinois 184-223, 234-54, 271-72 (1976) (discussing this service).
90. Stevens, supra note 79, at 977.
91. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 46 (Letter from W. Willard Wirtz to WBR 1
(May 23, 1947)); see also John M. Ferren, Salt of the Earth, Conscience of the Court: The
Story of Justice Wiley Rutledge 103, 111-12 (2004) (describing the relationship that began
in the mid-1930s when Rutledge, Dean of the University of Iowa College of Law, persuaded
an at-first-reluctant Wirtz to join his faculty).
92. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 46 (Letter from W. Willard Wirtz to WBR 1-2
(May 23, 1947)).
93. Id. (Letter from W. Willard Wirtz to WBR 2 (May 23, 1947) (misspelling of
Stevens's name in original)).
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finished his J.D. in Northwestern's 1947 summer session, then moved to
Washington to begin his clerkship. 94
C. Cold War Law Clerk
Wiley Blount Rutledge, Jr., had moved to Washington eight years earlier,
having resigned as law dean at the University of Iowa to become a federal
appellate judge. 95 Roosevelt remarked that his nominee brought with him
"'a lot of geography"': A preacher's son born in Kentucky, Rutledge had
studied and taught high school in several central and western states before
earning his law degree from the University of Colorado.96 He joined
Colorado's faculty after a brief stint in private practice; later, he served as
law professor and dean at Washington University in St. Louis as well as at
Iowa. 97
Rutledge was known for his humility, for his genuine liking of people
from all walks of life.98 "For the times," his biographer has written, "he
was unusually sensitive to the aspirations of women, of Jews, and ... of
African Americans." 99  He was an avid internationalist. In a speech
supporting the United Nations as a means to replace "rule of force" with
"rule of law," Rutledge gave the words of the Constitution a global reach as
he urged his audience not to
let pass, in timidity and division, the chance to establish justice, to form a
more perfect and embracing union, to insure both domestic and
international tranquility, to provide for the common defense of mankind,
and to secure the blessings of Liberty not only for ourselves and our
Posterity but to all the generations of the earth.100
94. In accepting Rutledge's offer of employment, Stevens proposed starting immediately
after he finished classes. Id. Box 42 (Letter from JPS to WBR (July 14, 1947)). A note
handwritten on this letter indicates that, in replying, Rutledge told Stevens to "take a week of
vacation" before starting. Stevens complied, and so began his clerkship on September 22.
Id. (Letter from JPS to WBR (July 24, 1947)).
95. See Ferren, supra note 91, at 100-30, 166-70 (writing of Rutledge's 1939
appointment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit).
96. Id. at 219 (quoting Roosevelt); see also id. at 13-48 (describing Rutledge's
upbringing in the home of a Southern Baptist minister and the educational path that led
Rutledge to Colorado).
97. See id. at 51-130 (describing Rutledge's faculty years).
98. See id. at 112, 178-83, 418. Stevens has written that Rutledge "was annoyed that
law clerks recently discharged from military service found it difficult to remain seated"
when he entered, and that he "liked to travel by day coach because he enjoyed the
conversation of his fellow passengers." John Paul Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in Mr.
Justice 177, 179 (Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 1956).
99. Ferren, supra note 91, at 418 (stating that Rutledge's wife "helped along" his
sympathy for African-Americans); see id at 115-19 (relating Rutledge's measured resistance
to discrimination while a law dean); id at 384-90 (describing Justice Rutledge's actions
respecting race discrimination and the status of women).
100. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 201 (Wiley B. Rutledge, The Alternative, at 1-2
(Mar. 30, 1946)). Compare id. with U.S. Const. pmbl. Rutledge was addressing an
international group formed at the time of the San Francisco Conference to "promote
friendship and understanding between lawyers of the United Nations and between the
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In private and public life Rutledge had fought against child labor and for
assistance of counsel, and he had spoken out,in defense of civil liberties in
time of war.101 Yet within months of joining the Supreme Court, Rutledge
lent his support to a wartime measure seen today as an unwarranted
suppression of liberty. He voted in 1943 to affirm the conviction of Gordon
Hirabayashi, an American who had defied curfew orders issued during the
internment of more than a hundred thousand residents of Japanese heritage
-and he did so despite apparent concern that invidious discrimination
underlay those orders. 10 2 That vote then compelled Rutledge to join five
Justices in affirming the conviction of Fred Korematsu on the ground that
"[p]ressing public necessity" justified treating persons of Japanese descent
differently from all other Americans.10 3
By 1946 Rutledge had less patience for executive curtailments of
fundamental rights. In a landmark opinion, he broke from the majority's
affirmance of a military commission verdict holding General Yamashita
criminally responsible for atrocities that Japanese troops had committed
during the battle for the Philippines. 10 4  Rutledge relied on the then-
applicable Geneva Convention and on domestic law. 10 5 Contending "that
nations themselves." Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 44 (Invitation to WBR from
Organizing Committee of the United Nations League of Lawyers); ef Ferren, supra note 91,
at 189, 392-402 (discussing other internationalist speeches by Rutledge); id. at 68 (tracing
Rutledge's "strong internationalism, unusual in the Midwest," to his days in St. Louis).
101. See Ferren, supra note 91, at 73-79, 263 (describing Rutledge's work against child
labor); id. at 187-89 (recounting Rutledge's wartime speeches); id. at 419 (discussing his
impact on defense rights).
102. See id. at 242-46 (describing Rutledge's role in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943)). Rutledge "seemed tempted" to join a draft dissent in which Justice Frank
Murphy stressed "that '[d]istinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent
with our traditions and ideals,"' and identified "'a melancholy resemblance' between "the
treatment of Japanese-Americans" by the United States and "'the treatment accorded to
members of the Jewish race in Germany and other parts of Europe."' Id. at 244 (quoting
Murphy). In the end, however, Rutledge filed a brief opinion concurring with the majority's
affirmance, and Murphy transformed the draft from a dissent into his own separate
concurrence. Id. at 244-46; see also Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 109-14 (Murphy, J.,
concurring); id. at 114 (Rutledge, J., concurring); Fowler V. Harper, Justice Rutledge and
The Bright Constellation 175-76 (1965). On internment see, for example, Peter Irons,
Justice at War (1983).
103. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (affirming the conviction
notwithstanding dissents by Justices Murphy, Robert H. Jackson, and Owen J. Roberts); see
also Ferren, supra note 91, at 246-59 (discussing the litigation of Korematsu and analyzing
Rutledge's reasons for joining the majority); Harper, supra note 102, at 176-78 (same).
104. Compare In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), with id. at 41-81 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). Murphy was the only other dissenter, id. at 26-41; Jackson did not take part in
the decision, id. at 26; see also Ferren, supra note 91, at 301-23 (discussing the case);
Patricia M. Wald, Rules of Evidence of the Yugoslav War Tribunal, 21 Quinnipiac L. Rev.
761, 770 (2003) (stating the desire "that current international law tribunals not devolve into
the kind of Yamashita trial the famous dissenters, Justices Murphy and Rutledge (and
probably history as well), condemned").
105. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 56-57, 61-81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citing inter alia
U.S. Const. amend. V; Articles of War, 10 U.S.C.: §§ 1471-1593 (1916); Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846).
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the Constitution follows the flag," 106 he decried the overseas proceedings as
contrary to the United States's "great constitutional traditions, none older or
more universally protective against unbridled power than due process of
law in the trial and punishment of men, that is, of all men, whether citizens,
aliens, alien enemies or enemy belligerents."'10 7
Rutledge was no more comfortable with the international war crimes
tribunals that the United States had helped to establish at Nuremberg and
Tokyo. Today, Nuremberg-and the opening statement of Justice Robert
H. Jackson, who took leave from the Court to serve as Chief U.S.
Prosecutor at the first triall08-is viewed as a wellspring of international
criminal justice. 109 But many of Jackson's brethren believed, as Justice
William 0. Douglas later put it, "that the Nuremberg Trials were
unconstitutional by American standards";"10 indeed, Chief Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone labeled the process a "'high-grade lynching party."
'
"
'
"
Rutledge, too, expressed opposition, telling a friend that the war crimes
trials were "'perversions of the legal process"' that had "'done more to
destroy any conception of democracy among the German and other
106. Id. at 47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 41-42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). A week later, Rutledge and Murphy reiterated
their opposition by dissenting from a military commission's capital conviction of the
Japanese general in command during the Bataan Death March. Compare In re Homma, 327
U.S. 759 (1946) (denying motions for review in one unsigned paragraph), with id. at 759-61
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (likening the petition to that in Yamashita) and id. at 761-63
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (same). See generally Harper, supra note 102, at 180-95 (providing
background and critique of both cases); David L. Herman, A Dish Best Not Served at All:
How Foreign Military War Crimes Suspects Lack Protection Under United States and
International Law, 172 Mil. L. Rev. 40 (2002) (same).
108. Jackson Opening, supra note 84, at 99-155. References to Jackson's address may be
found in, for example, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals
Chamber Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration (Mar. 31, 2000)
(Declaration of Judge Nieto-Navia), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1181, 1196 (2000); Antonio
Cassese, The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 585, 587 (2004); Diane
F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 Yale L.J. 2537, 2556 n.75, 2590 (1991). Jackson returned to the Court in
summer 1946. Taylor, supra note 66, at 547-48, 570.
109. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 66, at 634-41 (assessing the legacy of Nuremberg);
Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an
International Context, 75 Ind. L.J. 809, 818-20 (2000) (situating Nuremberg within the
history of movements toward international norms of criminal process); Allison Marston
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 75, 91-
92 (2005) (describing Nuremberg as the source for "[t]he modern conception of the
international criminal trial as a transitional justice tool").
110. William 0. Douglas, The Court Years 1939-1975, at 28 (1980) (emphasis omitted)
(attributing this view to Chief Justice Stone and Justices Murphy and Hugo Black as well as
himself); accord Taylor, supra note 66, at 418-21 (describing enmity between Jackson and
Black while the former was in Nuremberg).
111. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 716 (1956) (quoting
Stone); cf Homma, 327 U.S. at 760-61 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating that Justice
Rutledge, in his dissent, "agrees" with Justice's Murphy's view that, after Nuremberg, "[a]
procession of judicial lynchings without due process of law may now follow.").
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European peoples than almost any course we could have pursued."'' l 2
Rutledge was still talking about those trials when John Paul Stevens arrived
in 1947 to assist him in his fifth full Term on the Court." l3
Many matters on which Stevens worked included the claim that a
government practice deviated from American values-a charge that could
carry global consequence for a United States still adjusting to its new status
as one of the world's two superpowers. Three such cases deserve particular
mention.
In one, Ada Sipuel Hurst, an African American "concededly qualifed,"
sought to force compliance with the Court's order that Oklahoma provide
her a legal education "in conformity with the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."1 14 The Cold War politics of race surfaced in the
case, one of a series argued by lawyer Thurgood Marshall: A letter in
Rutledge's file warned "that some well known Communists are quite active
here in Oklahoma on behalf of Miss Sipuel's case.'115  The file also
contains a typescript clerk's memorandum, signed "jps," which advised
taking judicial notice that "the doctrine of segregation is itself a violation of
the Constitutional requirement," and concluded that "if there is any chance
of granting any relief, I would do so.'" 116 Rutledge filed a lone dissent from
112. Ferren, supra note 91, at 400 (quoting a letter by Rutledge).
113. Asked about the Nuremberg trials, Stevens later recalled,
I remember Justice Rutledge talking about them. He was very very troubled by
the ex post facto aspects of them. He also had serious misgivings about Jackson's
participation. He said that he felt it was inconsistent with his views before the
war, though I am not sure what he was referring to.
JPS Interview, supra note 16; see also Ferren, supra note 91, at 221-22 (stating that
Rutledge took his seat on Feb. 15, 1943, midway through the Court's 1942 Term).
114. Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (per
curiam) (citing Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)), quoted in Fisher v.
Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 148 (1948) (per curiam) (stating facts leading to the same petitioner's
mandamus action).
115. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 157 (Letter from Phil Higgins to WBR (Nov.
22, 1947)); see also John Paul Stevens, Address to the American Bar Association Thurgood
Marshall Awards Dinner Honoring Abner Mikva (Aug. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-06-05.html (recalling Marshall's
argument in Sipuel). See generally Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (1976) (detailing
Marshall's role in litigation against school segregation).
116. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 157 (jps, Fisher v. Justices of Okla. S. Ct. et al.,
at 2, 3). The critical portion of this memorandum stated in full:
Petitioner stresses the time element emphasized in this Court's mandate, and
asks that the Court take judicial notice of that fact that it is impossible to set up an
equal law school in the few days before the beginning of the new term at Okla
Univ.
I would shift the emphasis slightly. The mandate of this Court directs the state
to provide her with a legal education 'in conformity with the equal protection
clause.' I would think it possible to take judicial notice of the fact that (a) a law
school for one student cannot be equal, even if you accept the equal but separate
doctrine, and (b) the doctrine of segregation is itself a violationof the
Constitutional requirement. Then in order to comply with the mandate of
thisCourt, the state must admit her to Oklahoma Univ.
Id. at 2 (abbreviations and spacing in original).
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the denial of mandamus, though on a ground less bold than that advanced in
the memorandum. "17
A memorandum by Stevens likewise played a key role in Marino v.
Ragen, involving an Italian immigrant serving a life sentence for murder. "18
At the time of his arrest, petitioner, eighteen, had been in the United States
for two years. He spoke no English. The record indicated that he had
pleaded guilty without the benefit of defense counsel; at parts of the
proceedings the arresting officer acted as interpreter. It had taken twenty-
two years for a state judge to hear the petition for post-conviction relief-
and then to reject it without explaining whether denial was on the merits or
because petitioner had failed to choose the proper remedial path. 19 The
state confessed error before the Court, and most Justices agreed simply to
dispose of the case by vacating and remanding per curiam. But Rutledge
was not content to let Illinois-the source of roughly half the Court's
prisoner petitions° 20 -so easily off the hook. Writing in his own hand that
the case posed "the question of the course this Court should follow in the
future concerning the disposition of similar petitions," Rutledge then
adopted much of clerk Stevens's typescript draft for his concurrence, which
Justices Douglas and Frank Murphy joined. 121  The concurrence
incorporated Stevens's statement "that the Illinois procedural labyrinth is
made up entirely of blind alleys, each of which is useful only as a means of
convincing the federal courts that the state road which the petitioner has
taken was the wrong one." 122 Stating that prisoners "are required to ride
the Illinois merry-go-round of habeas corpus, coram nobis, and writ of
error," the concurrence, like the typescript draft, concluded that, even if the
state had not confessed error, federal review would have been warranted. 123
Rutledge soon wrote the law dean at the University of Chicago: "I had
been waiting for the Marino chance for some time. It was of course
questionable whether a blast of that sort might not do more harm than good,
but we concluded that things could not be much worse and that the blowout
117. Fisher, 333 U.S. at 151 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (arguing that state courts had not
complied with the Court's mandate in Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 631 (per curiam)).
118. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 561-62 (1947).
119. Id. at 561-63; id. at 565 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 563 (citing statistics for the previous three Terms).
121. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 158 (Marino v. Ragen, Rutledge's handwritten
draft, 1st page). Compare id with Marino, 332 U.S. at 563 (Rutledge, J., joined by Douglas
and Murphy, JJ., concurring).
122. Marino, 332 U.S. at 567 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Compare id. with Rutledge
Papers, supra note 16, Box 158 (Marino v. Ragen, typescript inserted into Rutledge's
handwritten draft, at 3 (Dec. 12, 1947)). Stevens, of course, had served as editor of a law
review volume that published an article on the subject. See supra text accompanying note 88
(mentioning Comment, supra note 88, cited in Marino, 332 U.S. at 569 n.1 1 (Rutledge, J.,
concurring)).
123. Compare Marino, 332 U.S. at 570 (Rutledge, J., concurring), with Rutledge Papers,
supra note 16, Box 158 (Marino v. Ragen, typescript inserted into Rutledge's handwritten
draft, at 4 (Dec. 12, 1947)).
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might help."'124  The concurrence attracted media coverage and
correspondence from grateful prisoners. 125  Another letter included a
reminder of the brooding Cold War: A Chicagoan commended the Marino
concurrence, then urged Rutledge to continue to "uph[o]ld the right of free
expression... particularly since the present 'Red'-baiting often takes the
form of trying to deny freedom of expression to our citizens.... We want
no communism here; but we likewise do not want fascism brought in
behind the smoke-screen of a 'red' scare." 126
Tension between individual rights and national security was overt in
Ahrens v. Clark, brought by more than a hundred German-born U.S.
residents whom the Attorney General unilaterally had declared dangerous
during the war against Nazi Germany. 127 From a detention center on Ellis
Island, they argued that the executive's power to deport alien enemies had
ended with the war; because the Court already had refused two similar
challenges, clerk Stevens called the petition "apparently unmeritorious."'1 28
But this time review was granted. In a pre-argument memorandum,
Stevens stated that the executive would have power to deport, but only if
the judiciary first had exercised its own power to scrutinize the asserted
justification for deportation. 129 The majority never reached that question.
It affirmed the ruling below that courts in the District of Columbia, where
the petition had been filed, had no jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of
detention in New York. 130 Rutledge prepared a dissent that Justices Hugo
Black and Frank Murphy would join. 13 1 "For the first time this Court puts
a narrow and rigid territorial limitation upon issuance of the writ" of habeas
124. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 158 (Letter from WBR to Wilber G. Katz (Jan.
19, 1948)).
125. See Illinois Cases Show Workings of 'Merry-Go-Round' of Courts; Prisoners Assert
Rights Were Denied, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 18, 1948, at 2A. This article and the
inmates' letters are contained in Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 158.
126. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 158 (Letter from Edward G. Punkay to WBR
(Dec. 29, 1947)); see Ferren, supra note 91, at 260-71 (discussing Rutledge's First
Amendment jurisprudence). Notably, adjacent to the article cited supra note 125 was
another that evinced Cold War tensions. See Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 158
(containing Showdown Due with Russians, Publisher Says, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 18,
1948, at 2A).
127. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 189 (1948).
128. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 156 (Supplemental Memo, AHRENS * No.
446). Though this typescript is unsigned, other documents in this file make it clear that
Stevens worked on the case. They include the primary certiorari memorandum, which sets
forth arguments restated in this supplement. See Id. (jps, Ahrens et al v. Clark).
129. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 156 (ps, Bench Memo, Ahrens v. Clark). The
memo stated, "I should think that even an alien enemy ought to be entitled to a fair hearing
on the question whether he is in fact dangerous." Id. jps, Bench Memo, Ahrens v. Clark, at
5)
130. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 189-93.
131. Only Rutledge and Black favored reversal at the post-argument conference. See
Rutledge's handwritten notes on back of first three pages of Rutledge Papers, supra note 16,
Box 156 Ops, Bench Memo, Ahrens v. Clark). Box 156 contains the note to Rutledge by
which Murphy switched his vote after the draft dissent circulated: "I voted the other way but
I now believe you are right + that your opinion is a fine job."
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corpus, and thus "attenuates the personal security of every citizen,"
Rutledge wrote in his own hand. 132 He then set forth his interpretation of
the relevant statute, interweaving his own words with those from a
typescript draft dissent by Stevens. Rutledge incorporated Stevens's
observation that the majority's decision would foreclose review for
"petitioners detained by the military authorities in Germany and Japan"-
some held "pursuant to sentences imposed by military tribunals for alleged
offenses," some "confined for indefinite periods without charge and without
trial."'1 33 Even as he wrote that "the full ramifications of the decision are
difficult to foresee," Rutledge excerpted three possibilities from Stevens's
draft: There might be no relief "where persons are wrongfully detained in
places unknown," perhaps in military custody or, like Hirabayashi, on
account of a "mass evacuation," or "even from wilful misconduct by
arbitrary executive officials overreaching their constitutional or statutory
authority."'134 The concurrence, like the draft, concluded: "These dangers
may seem unreal in the United States. But the experience of less fortunate
countries should serve as a warning against the unwarranted curtailment of
the jurisdiction of our courts to protect the liberty of the individual by
means of the writ of habeas corpus."'135
D. Young Mr. Stevens
It is a testament to the strength of their relationship that in the one year
before Rutledge's death at age fifty-five, 136 Stevens penned a number of
long letters to his former boss, and Rutledge responded. Notably, each
letter addressed Rutledge not as "Justice," but "Judge."
Soon after returning to Chicago, Stevens wrote of his interest in helping
"Adlai Stephenson"; the diplomat who had once published in
Northwestern's law journal was a candidate in the 1948 Illinois
gubernatorial election.137 Stevens apologized for begging off a post at Yale
Law School in favor of the practice. He wrote that he was "particularly
132. Compare Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 194 (Rutledge, J., dissenting), with Rutledge Papers,
supra note 16, Box 156 (Ahrens v. Clark, Rutledge's handwritten draft, 1st page).
133. Compare Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 208-09 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citing cases), with
Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 156 (Draft dissent, Ahrens v. Clark, at 4 (Stevens's
typescript inserted into Rutledge's handwritten draft, at 15)).
134. Compare Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 195, 210 (Rutledge, J., dissenting), with Rutledge
Papers, supra note 16, Box 156 (Draft dissent, Ahrens v. Clark, at 5 (Stevens's typescript
inserted into Rutledge's handwritten draft, at 15)).
135. Compare Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 210 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citing Hirabayashi),
with Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 156 (Draft dissent, Ahrens v. Clark, at 5
(Stevens's typescript inserted into Rutledge's handwritten draft, at 15). For other accounts
of Stevens's role in Ahrens, see Joseph T. Thai, The Law Clerk Who Wrote Rasul v. Bush:
John Paul Stevens' Influence from World War H to the War on Terror, 92 Va. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2006); Charles Lane, Stevens Brings a Historical Perspective to Detainees'
Case, Wash. Post, May 3, 2004, at A19.
136. See Ferren, supra note 91, at 416 (stating that Rutledge died on Sept. 10, 1949, two
weeks after suffering a stroke while driving his wife to a church potluck).
137. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 42 (Letter from JPS to WBR (Sept. 4, 1948)).
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favorably impressed" by the Poppenhusen firm, noting that "contrary to the
practice of most of the successful outfits in Chicago, there are severals Jews
in the organization."' 138 But at twenty-five lawyers the firm "is a little
larger than I would like,"'139 Stevens added.
The Justice wrote quickly to reassure his former clerk about Yale. 140
"Please don't misunderstand me about the whole business. I became fully
convinced that you had the makings of a fine teacher and of course I am
always glad to see men of that type enter that branch of the profession,"
Rutledge wrote, adding that he did not start his legal career as a teacher,
either. "Whether a man starts one way or the other and whether he shifts
are largely matters of personal inclination and taste," he continued, then
concluded with a reference to Stevens's interest in Stevenson, "I am glad
you have in mind so definitely something more than sticking to the routines
of practice and I shall be glad particularly to learn about the character and
details of your political activities during the coming campaign."
After a few months at Poppenhusen Stevens was restless, and predicted
that soon he would leave either to take a job in the administration of
Stevenson, by then governor, or "to hang out a shingle with one or two
other fellows of about my age." 141 Eventually he turned down a state offer;
he explained that it was in the finance department, and besides, it came
while he was trying his first case. 142 "I could no more have quit my job in
the midst of the trial," Stevens wrote, "than I could have quit a
championship (assuming I were a championship player) tennis match with
the score tied .... I had a swell time trying to win. 1 43 On another matter,
Stevens expressed disappointment at the Court's refusal to hear an Illinois
prisoner petition on which he had worked, then hastened to report that the
state legislature "finally" had put an end to the post-conviction labyrinth
that Rutledge had condemned in Marino.144
138. Id. (adding that "[t~hey will pay me $350, which I think is a fair starting salary").
The firm then called Poppenhusen, Johnston, Thompson and Raymond is now known as
Jenner & Block. See Biographical Data, supra note 60, at lv; Taylor, supra note 1, at 48.
139. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 42 (Letter from JPS to WBR (Sept. 4, 1948)).
140. All quotations in this paragraph are from id. (carbon copy of Letter from WBR to
JPS (Sept. 17, 1948)). Cf Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 42 (Letter from Wesley A.
Sturges, Dean of Yale Law School, to WBR (July 7, 1948) (inquiring about Stevens and
containing a handwritten note of reply, "J.S. O.K.-no reservations")). Not long after this
exchange, Stevens began an eight-year stint teaching antitrust law as an adjunct professor.
Biographical Data, supra note 60, at lv (stating that he lectured at Northwestern from 1950
to 1954 and at the University of Chicago from 1955 to 1958).
141. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 42 (Letter from JPS to WBR 1-2 (Jan. 22,
1949)).
142. Id. (Letter from JPS to WBR 2 (July 11, 1949)).
143. Id. (Letter from JPS to WBR 2-3 (July 11, 1949)).
144. "I should have thought," Stevens wrote, "that the series of outrages which we
described to you there would have collected four votes even though the Fourth Amendment
has been reduced to a 'pale and frayed carbon copy of the original."' Rutledge Papers, supra
note 16, Box 42 (Letter from JPS to WBR 6-7 (July 11, 1949) (quoting, without citation, a
two-week-old passage in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 48 (1949) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting))); see also Ferren, supra note 91, at 372 (attributing the legislature's action to
pressure from the full Court, which eventually joined Rutledge in voicing objections to
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Stevens related that in recent weeks, "I have been quite deeply troubled
by the Hiss trial."' 145 Alger Hiss, born sixteen years earlier than Stevens,
was a onetime law clerk to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 146 As a
State Department officer for a decade beginning in 1936, Hiss had
accompanied Roosevelt to the Yalta Conference and, along with Stevenson,
had helped organize the San Francisco Conference.147 Soon after Hiss left
government service, the House Committee on Un-American Activities
began investigating a charge that Hiss had passed state secrets to a
Communist agent; eventually Hiss was indicted on charges that, in denying
the accusation, he had perjured himself.148 The case stirred debate among
many in the United States and abroad.149 Stevens was no exception.
Writing Rutledge three days after the jury hung in what would come to be
known as the first Hiss trial,' 50 Stevens reported, "Through the early stages
of the trial, and through most of Hiss' testimony, I had not the slightest
doubt of his innocence and was indignant at the persecution." And yet, "I
find it almost impossible to believe his defense," Stevens continued. The
government's evidence was "not enough to convince me 'beyond a
reasonable doubt,"' Stevens wrote, but then allowed that "as a mere
spectator one tends to apply a weight of the evidence test." "Shake[n]" by
the jury's vote, Stevens "wonder[ed] how many of the eight voters for
conviction were substantially influenced by the distorted accounts in the
press," and found "most shocking" reports that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation was investigating the four who voted to acquit. The letter's
detail and emotion demonstrate that, even as he immersed himself in what
Illinois' procedures, and from the state bar association); supra text accompanying notes 118-
26 (discussing Marino).
145. Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 42 (Letter from JPS to WBR 3 (July 11,
1949)). All quotations of Stevens in this paragraph are contained in this letter.
146. The Earl Jowitt, The Strange Case of Alger Hiss 59-60 (1953).
147. Id. at 62-63; see also Alistair Cooke, A Generation on Trial: U.S.A. vs. Alger Hiss
7-8 (1952) (referring to both roles and further stating that the extent of Hiss's influence at
Yalta was overblown by his opponents yet "curiously abetted" by his defense counsel);
Martin, supra note 89, at 405-07 (discussing the controversy stirred by the deposition that
then-Governor Stevenson gave under court order in the Hiss case, and noting that Supreme
Court Justices Felix Frankfurter and Stanley Reed also were character witnesses for Hiss).
148. Among those who analyzed these events were the accused and his accuser. See
Whittaker Chambers, Witness (1952); Alger Hiss, In the Court of Public Opinion (1957).
Other contemporary accounts included Cooke, supra note 147 (report by a British journalist
then writing for the Guardian of Manchester, England), and Jowitt, supra note 146 (analysis
of legal proceedings by a jurist who had served as Britain's Attorney General, Solicitor
General, and Lord Chancellor).
149. See Cooke, supra note 147, at 9-11 (reporting on "motives that impelled people to
take one side or the other, or even to take no side at all," and noting that although "[m]any
Democrats and old New Dealers" sympathized with Hiss, so too did "many conservative
Easterners, Democrats and Republicans, of gentle upbringing or social pretension who felt as
a threat from below what the common man might sense as an imposition from above").
150. See id. at 274-76 (relating reports of an eight-to-four jury deadlock); id at 355
(stating in the chronology that the first trial lasted from May 31 to July 8, 1949). A second
trial ended in a conviction, and on March 22, 1950, Hiss began serving a five-year term in
federal prison. See id at 330-39, 356.
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would become a successful private practice, 151 Stevens remained engaged
in the public issues of the day.152
III. JUSTICE ENGAGED
Engagement with the world and America's place in it persisted after
Stevens filled the seat vacated by Justice Douglas in 1975.153 Among the
books Stevens read during the Court's 2004 summer break was the report of
the commission established to investigate what led to the terrorism of
September 11, 2001, and what to do to prevent new attacks. 154 The other
two were just-published biographies: Ron Chernow's study of Alexander
Hamilton and John M. Ferren's study of Wiley Rutledge. 155 To find a
synergy among these choices one need only reconsider Stevens's role in
recent cases of transnational moment.
A. Stevens, Rutledge, and the Duty of the Judge
In a speech Stevens himself pointed out that an opinion portrayed in the
Rutledge biography-the 1948 dissent in Ahrens-"significantly influenced
an important case decided less than three months ago."'156 He was referring
to Rasul, the 2004 decision in which four Justices joined Stevens in
rejecting the executive's post-September 11 effort to hold noncitizens
whom it had labeled enemies at sites where U.S. courts could examine
neither the asserted justification for nor the alleged conditions of
detention. 157  Stevens stressed Ahrens's effect on interpretation of the
federal habeas statute. 158  But the influence of the case was more
151. In 1952, Stevens helped to establish the Chicago firm of Rothschild, Stevens, Barry
and Myers, where he tried antitrust cases for plaintiffs and defendants until his appointment
in 1970 to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Biographical Data, supra note
60, at Iv; Taylor, supra note 1, at 48.
152. Whether Hiss was in fact a Soviet spy remains a point of contention to this day.
Compare David Lowenthal, Did Allen Weinstein Get the Alger Hiss Story Wrong?, History
News Network, May 2, 2005, http://hnn.us/articles/11579.html (refuting documents released
in the 1990s that purported to establish Hiss's involvement in espionage), with G. Edward
White, The Reinstatement of Alger Hiss's Law License, 8 Green Bag 2d 383, 390 (2005)
(asserting that Hiss spied for the Soviets from the 1930s until 1946).
153. See Leonard Orland, John Paul Stevens, in V The Justices of the United States
Supreme Court 1690, 1691 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997) (describing the
circumstances that led President Gerald R. Ford to select Stevens). Douglas's chief rival in
1939 had been Rutledge. Roosevelt named Rutledge instead to the Court of Appeals, where
he served until he joined the Supreme Court in 1943. See Ferren, supra note 91, at 151-221.
154. John Paul Stevens, What IDid This Summer, CBA Record, Oct. 2004, at 34; see The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States (authorized ed. 2004).
155. Stevens, supra note 154, at 34-35; see Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (2004);
Ferren, supra note 91.
156. Stevens, supra note 154, at 35; see also Ferren, supra note 91, at 372-73, 412-13.
On the circumstances of Rutledge's dissent described in this paragraph, see supra text
accompanying notes 127-35.
157. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470-85 (2004) (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); see supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
158. See Stevens, supra note 154, at 35.
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fundamental. As a law clerk, Stevens had advised Rutledge that the
executive held the power to expel petitioners in Ahrens provided they first
received due judicial scrutiny. For Rutledge the thwarting of that proviso
was the heart of the matter. Although the case had been brought by
German-born residents, Rutledge saw the issue as nothing less than "the
personal security of every citizen" to be free from wrongful deprivation of
liberty at the hands of "jailers" acting "in defiance of federal judicial
power."' 159 Stevens's own draft dissent embodied that sensibility; indeed, it
gave examples of deprivations that might follow from the Court's refusal to
consider the petition.
One of those examples expressly cited the 1943 case in which Rutledge
had gone along with the majority in endorsing executive orders to confine
American citizens and residents of Japanese descent. 160 That the Justice
incorporated into his dissent his clerk's negative reference to Hirabayashi
speaks volumes about how Rutledge's views had shifted in five years. In
that half decade the United States had succeeded in its campaign with
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union against Axis aggression. It had
launched reconstruction initiatives that ranged from establishing an
international organization to regulate the waging of war, to international
investment in war-torn economies, to international trials of deposed leaders
on war crimes charges. And it had begun to examine its own responsibility
for deprivations of the liberty and equality that its Constitution promised-
an introspection fostered both by postwar revulsion at totalitarian excess
and Cold War desire to give the lie to Communists' anti-U.S.
propaganda.161 Rutledge long had advocated preservation of liberty against
executive encroachments; as Terms passed he put the strength of his votes
behind those words. Thus Rutledge's dissent in Ahrens, with its warning
that in limiting judges' power to check executive action the United States
invited abuses like those suffered by "less fortunate countries,"1 62 flowed
logically from his dissent two years earlier in Yamashita. At base of
Rutledge's opposition to the process by which the Japanese general had
been sentenced to death lay a conviction that when the United States
ventures abroad with its power-its "flag"-it remains obliged to treat
159. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 194, 195 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Stevens
quoted these passages at length in a 1956 essay on his mentor. See Stevens, supra note 98, at
180.
160. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 210 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citing Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)); see also supra note 135 (showing that Rutledge adopted the
citation from Stevens's draft dissent).
161. See Dudziak, Desegregation, supra note 87, at 101-02 (writing of the distress
expressed by a presidential committee on civil rights regarding the degree to which the U.S.
civil rights record was a matter of international concern); Primus, supra note 87, at 456
(contending that "much of postwar constitutional thought could be described as a quest for a
legal formula that would solve the totalitarian problem").
162. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 210 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also supra note 135
(indicating that the passage incorporated Stevens's draft dissent).
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foreigners as well as citizens in accordance with due process and its other
"great constitutional traditions."' 63
There can be little doubt that the dissent in Yamashita took courage, for
Rutledge's case file brims with letters berating him for supporting a
"Jap." 164 Nor is there doubt of the lasting impression made on one former
Navy officer, the law student who became Rutledge's clerk a year and a
half after the dissent issued. Justice Stevens featured Yamashita in his 2004
recap of Ferren's biography. 165 That same year he cited the case in Rasul-
tellingly, he did so in a positive sense, to show that the United States once
had allowed greater judicial review than the executive wished to afford in
the case at bar. 166 A decade earlier, Stevens subtly linked the trial by the
United States of Yamashita in the Philippines to the U.S. kidnapping of
Alvarez-Machain in Mexico for trial in the United States. In warning that
repression of an enemy invites oppression of oneself, Stevens repeated
verbatim, though he did not so cite it, Rutledge's quotation in Yamashita of
Thomas Paine. 167 And as long ago as a 1956 essay, Stevens restated a
passage in Yamashita consistent with the desire to do right on civil rights:
Rutledge, Stevens reminded, had insisted that as the United States and its
allies entered "'a new era of law in the world, it becomes more important
than ever before ... to observe their greatest traditions of administering
justice."" 68
Within those traditions is judicial review of incarceration after
sentencing, by way of direct appeal or habeas or some other procedure. On
this matter too Stevens's mid-century experiences-before, during, and
after his service as a law clerk-played a role in his decision making as a
Justice. 169  Stevens knew of the impenetrable maze of Illinois post-
163. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41-42, 47 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting), quoted
in supra text accompanying note 107.
164. See generally Rutledge Papers, supra note 16, Box 137. Notably, a number of the
letters in praise of the dissent came from correspondents who had served in uniform during
World War II. Id; see also Ferren, supra note 91, at 321-22 (writing of the public response
to the dissent).
165. See Stevens, supra note 154, at 34-35.
166. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474-75 (2004); see supra text accompanying note 43.
Cf Dorsen, supra note 18, at xxvi-xxvii (outlining the relation between Rutledge's dissents
in Yamashita and Ahrens and Stevens's own jurisprudence, and stating well before
September 11 that Rutledge's example had given Stevens "courage").
167. Compare United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 688 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (reference to Paine quoted supra text accompanying note 39), with Yamashita,
327 U.S. at 81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (setting forth the same quotation of Paine, drawn
from the same source). Preceding this passage is Stevens's explicit quotation of Rutledge's
dissent in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 342 (1947), quoted in supra
text accompanying note 38; see also supra text accompanying note 50 (noting an analogous
sentence in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
168. Stevens, supra note 98, at 189 (quoting In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 43 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting)).
169. On the circumstances surrounding Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563-70 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., concurring), as well as Stevens's related experiences discussed in this
paragraph, see supra text accompanying notes 118-26, 144. See also Stevens, supra note 98,
at 190-91 (discussing Marino).
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conviction remedies from his service as a law review editor; in working as a
law clerk on Marino he tried firsthand to negotiate that labyrinth. The
emphatic Rutledge concurrence to which Stevens contributed proved a
catalyst for change, but only after Stevens as a lawyer had helped petition
the Court for relief in yet another Illinois matter. These cases marked the
beginning of Stevens's lifelong professional effort to assure that the state
wields its power to punish with the fundamental fairness that the
Constitution demands. 170 As evidenced in capital punishment cases like
Thompson and Atkins, Justice Stevens has labored to narrow the substantive
and procedural grounds for death eligibility, an approach that Professors
James S. Liebman and Lawrence C. Marshall have given the apt label "less
is better."' 171 He has questioned publicly the death penalty's morality and
risk of error. 172 And he has been "'awfully careful before he let a capital
case go '"-phrasing first used to describe Justice Rutledge. 173
One can push these parallels too far. Rutledge reportedly did not convey
his thoughts about the propriety of the death penalty and, even if he had, his
clerk surely could have disagreed. 174 Stevens has traced his personal views
170. See John Paul Stevens, How a Mundane Assignment Affected My Re-Examination of
Miranda, CBA Record, Oct. 2000, at 34, 35-37 (discussing the difficulties that remained
even after post-conviction reforms, and relating his own pro bono representation in People v.
La Frana, 122 N.E.2d 583 (Ii. 1954), of a defendant whom police had "strung up over the
door and beaten" and "held incommunicado and subjected to continuous questioning for
several days" in order to extract a confession to murder); Convention Notebook, S.F. Chron.,
Aug. 11, 1992, at A4 (reporting Stevens's comment to an American Bar Association meeting
that his own pro bono practice "convinced him that defendants in state criminal cases ought
to continue to be able to appeal to the federal courts"); see also Orland, supra note 153, at
1701-09 (summarizing "Stevens on criminal procedure"); William D. Popkin, A Common
Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 Duke L.J. 1087,
1123-25 (discussing Stevens's concept of liberty in criminal justice matters and his view of
prisoners "as a classic case of a vulnerable, discrete, and insular minority").
171. Liebman & Marshall, supra note 21, at 1675; see supra text accompanying notes 20-
27, 51-54 (discussing, for example, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005) (Stevens,
J., concurring); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-21 (2002) (Stevens, J.); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 819-48 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.)).
172. See Stevens, supra note 115 (stating that, given evidence of errors in death
sentencing, "there must be serious flaws in our administration of criminal justice," and
discussing certain "features of death penalty litigation that create special risks of
unfairness"); see also Abdon M. Pallasch, High court justice: U.S. would be better off
without death penalty, Chi. Sun-Times, May 12, 2004, at 12 (reporting that, even though he
"still thinks the death penalty is constitutional," Stevens told the Seventh Circuit Bar
Association that "'it's a very unfortunate part of our judicial system and I would feel much,
much better if more states would really consider whether they think the benefits outweigh
the very serious potential for injustice"').
173. Ferren, supra note 91, at 351 (quoting another former Rutledge law clerk); id. at
350-52 (discussing Rutledge's treatment of selected capital cases). For accounts of the
Rutledge-Stevens connection in other contexts, see, for example, Allison Marston Danner &
Adam Marcus Samaha, Judicial Oversight in Two Dimensions: Charting Area and Intensity
in the Decisions of Justice Stevens, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2051 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro,
Justice Stevens's Theory ofInteractive Federalism, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2133 (2006).
174. See Ferren, supra note 91, at 350-51 ("The Court in Rutledge's time never
considered the constitutionality of capital punishment as such, and Rutledge himself is not
known to have expressed an opinion on that."); cf Tony Mauro, High Court '89: Highlights
and High Jinks, Legal Times, Dec. 18, 1989, at 8 (reporting Stevens's statement that his
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about capital punishment to his involvement as a Navy codebreaker in the
downing of Admiral Yamamoto's plane during World War II.175 But while
military service is formative, it does not set everyone on the same path.
Civil War duty led Justice Holmes to esteem conflict and abhor human
rights. 176 More recently, Justices who had served in uniform divided on
whether the Constitution forbids criminal punishment for burning the
American flag. 177 That superior officers expressed no qualms in 1943
about targeting Yamamoto suggests earlier sources for Stevens's
"humanitarian" unease. Rutledge's diligence in capital cases may have
nurtured seeds of doubt already present in his clerk's mind. 178
A similar dynamic may have been at play in the Sipuel litigation. The
case reached the Court amid calls for enforcement of civil rights, fueled on
one hand by outrage at lynchings and beatings of African-American
veterans just returned from the war, and on the other hand by a desire to
dispel criticism abroad of racism at home. 179 Stevens has recalled watching
from the law clerks' "cane chairs on the South side of the courtroom" the
January 1948 day that an advocate-the future Justice Thurgood Marshall,
with whom Stevens would serve on the Court-argued for Sipuel's
admission to law school: "Thurgood was respectful, forceful and
persuasive-so persuasive that on the following Monday-only four days
opinion in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which Stevens
argued that the First Amendment permits punishment for flag burning, "caused some debate
within his chambers" because "'[a]ll three of my law clerks disagreed with me violently').
175. On the Yamamoto incident discussed in this paragraph, see supra text accompanying
notes 68-78.
176. Professor Albert W. Alschuler convincingly has linked Holmes's time in combat
with Holmes's statement in 1916 that he did not "'respect the rights of man ... except those
things a given crowd will fight for,"' and in 1920, "'I think that the sacredness of human life
is a purely municipal ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction. I believe that force,
mitigated so far as may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio."' Albert W. Alschuler, Law
Without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes 26, 24 (2000) (quoting two
letters by Holmes); see id. at 17-27, 46-50, 137 (elaborating on war as source of Holmes's
views).
177. William J. Brennan and Anthony M. Kennedy, who were in the Army and the
California Army National Guard respectively, were among the five Justices who maintained
in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), that the First Amendment precluded punishment.
Dissenters included three World War I1 veterans: Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who
served in the Army Air Corps, and Justices Stevens and Byron R. White, both of whom were
in the Navy. See generally V, VI The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, supra
note 153.
178. In a 1996 speech, Stevens said that when nominated to the Court he did not himself
know how he would vote on capital punishment. John Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly
Address, American Bar Association Annual Meeting, Orlando, Florida, August 3, 1996, 12
St. John's J. Legal Comment. 21, 25, 31 (1996) (adding that "[o]ur friends in Western
Europe are unwilling to assume the risk of injustice associated with the execution of an
innocent defendant," and though "the question was not raised at my confirmation hearings,
before and after those hearings I have pondered, but never been able to explain, why our
country must assume that appalling risk").
179. See Dudziak, Desegregation, supra note 87, at 77-93 (describing race-related
violence and U.S. officials' concerns about unfavorable international press coverage). On
the circumstances surrounding the case of Ada Sipuel Hurst, discussed in this paragraph, see
supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
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after the argument-the Court unanimously ruled in Sipuel's favor."' 80
Clerk Stevens no doubt was jolted to receive, just weeks later, a mandamus
action reporting that Oklahoma continued to resist giving Sipuel a legal
education. Rutledge may have been poised to act against segregated
education, 181 and that may have influenced Stevens's memorandum
advising the Justice to rule segregation unconstitutional. But the fact that
this solution proved too bold for Rutledge, coupled with the urgent tone of
Stevens's search for "any chance of granting any relief," point to a deep
personal belief in the duty of judges to ensure that all persons benefit from
the guarantees contained in the Constitution.
B. Foreign Context, Respectfully Considered
Among the framers of that Constitution was Alexander Hamilton, whose
biography Stevens read in 2004. There is serendipity in that timing. The
next year, Scalia branded the decision forbidding execution of children "a
mockery... of Hamilton's expectation" that the judiciary would be
"'bound down by strict rules and precedents,"' and thus prompted Stevens
to reply, "[T]hat our understanding of the Constitution does change from
time to time has been settled since John Marshall breathed life into its text.
If great lawyers of his day-Alexander Hamilton, for example-were
sitting with us today, I would expect them to join" the principal opinion.18 2
Stevens had pressed for a ban on the juvenile death penalty seventeen years
earlier in Thompson.'8 3 But he had come up one vote short of a majority,
and his plurality opinion touched off more than a decade of struggle over
the scope of the state's power to impose capital punishment. In laying
claim in 2005 to the legacy of Federalist forebears, Stevens underscored
that the Court had come around both to the result he had urged in Thompson
and, importantly, to the reasoning by which he had reached that result.18 4
180. Stevens, supra note 115; see also John Paul Stevens, Judicial Activism: Ensuring
the Powers and Freedoms Conceived by the Framers for Today's World, CBA Record, Oct.
2002, at 25, 26 (citing the Sipuel litigation as an example of "judicial activism" with which
"I now agree").
181. Ferren quoted Louis Pollak, who succeeded Stevens as a Rutledge law clerk and is
now a federal judge, "that Rutledge 'would have moved' on outlawing racial discrimination
in the schools 'if he'd had the chance'; however, Pollak's supposition was based in part on
the instant opinion dissenting from denial of mandamus. See Ferren, supra note 91, at 387.
182. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-08 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting The
Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); id. at 587
(Stevens, J., concurring).
183. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818-48 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Stevens,
J.); see supra text accompanying notes 20-29 (discussing Thompson and the consequent
dispute over the use of external norms to determine whether the Constitution permits capital
punishment in certain circumstances).
184. Accord Simmons, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring) (calling the Court's
"reaffirmation" of the evolving standards principle "[p]erhaps even more important than our
specific holding"); Diane Marie Amann, "Raise the Flag and Let it Talk": On the Use of
External Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 2 J. Int'l Const. L. 597, 598-605 (2004)
(describing the progression of the Justices' positions on consultation of foreign norms in the
context of evolving standards and similar doctrines).
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Stevens's opinions in Thompson, Atkins, and related cases stand as
examples of the Justice's abiding conviction that constitutional protection
cannot be confined by centuries-old practices that have no current
resonance. Rather, the Constitution is to be enforced according to
contemporary American values. To determine those values, moreover, it is
entirely appropriate to take into account international norms embodied in
treaty or custom, as well as foreign laws and practices, that shed light on the
meaning of open-ended constitutional terms like "due process" or "cruel
and unusual punishments." Stevens's views are by no means novel. In the
1930s, scholars debated the degree to which constitutional meaning adapts
to what then-Dean Rutledge called "'modem needs"'; indeed, as Stevens
observed, the concept of a living Constitution owes much to the lifework of
Chief Justice Marshall.185 Consultation of external norms likewise may be
traced along a path that runs from Marshall and authors of The Federalist to
Justices who now hold an evident interest in transnational aspects of
domestic cases. 186
On that path lies the mid-twentieth century, a period of great global
change. Desire to deter catastrophic conflict and to avoid the abuses of
force that had characterized just-vanquished regimes spurred adoption of
new frameworks for collective security and international cooperation. The
Charter of the United Nations followed fast upon the end of war in Europe
in 1945, and was joined within years by a similar charter for the
Americas, 18 7 by multilateral codifications of human rights, 88 and by one
treaty against genocide and four designed to regulate the conduct of armed
conflict.' 8 9 Influential in the drafting of these instruments were Americans
185. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring), quoted in supra text
accompanying note 182; Ferren, supra note 91, at 125 (quoting a 1936 draft document,
attributed to Rutledge, that supported Roosevelt's Court-packing plan as a means to dilute
the power of anti-New Deal Justices).
186. See Amann, supra note 29 (marking this tradition). Stevens has dated the evolving
standards approach to Eighth Amendment interpretation not simply to Chief Justice Earl
Warren's statement in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), but rather to a turn-of-the-
century opinion in which the Court held that the term "'cruel and unusual punishments'
operated to invalidate a sentence, derived from Spanish law and imposed in the U.S.-held
Philippines, to fifteen years of "hard, enchained labor" and the denial of certain civil rights.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821 n.4 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.) (discussing Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
187. U.N. Charter; OAS Charter, supra note 36; see also supra text accompanying notes
81-87 (discussing postwar legal developments).
188. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, Ninth
Int'l Conf. of Am. States, OEA/Ser. L./V/I.4, rev. (1965) (adopted Mar. 30-May 2, 1948);
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
102 Stat. 3045, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].
189. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Fourth
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-Democrats like Adlai Stevenson and Eleanor Roosevelt and Republicans
like Senator Arthur VandenbergI 90-who understood that the United States
had emerged from World War II with new global responsibilities. Cold
War competition, moreover, reinforced a felt need for enforcement of
constitutional rights, so that the United States truly might lead by example.
Justice Rutledge, an internationalist whose jurisprudence would earn him
description as a "champion of human rights," vocally supported initiatives
to extend worldwide the U.S. Constitution's promises of justice, peace, and
lasting liberty. 191 But like some of his brethren, Rutledge drew the line at
Nuremberg: From their perspective, the trials before international military
tribunals and special U.S. military commissions constituted unwelcome
distortions of the American legal tradition. 192
Aspects of Rutledge's approach may be found in the jurisprudence of his
former law clerk. Justice Stevens is aware of foreign context, as was
Rutledge; furthermore, both have analyzed external norms, practice, and
effects through the lens of American tradition. Stevens has resisted
wholesale globalization of the U.S. Constitution. In Verdugo-Urquidez, he
deemed U.S. judges powerless under the Fourth Amendment to regulate
searches that U.S. agents conducted abroad, and in Balsys he contended that
the Fifth Amendment interposes no obstacle to overseas use of testimony
compelled in the United States for the reason that such use would not
render unfair any American criminal prosecution.193 Stevens's decisions in
the 2004 detention trilogy left unstated his position on the extent to which
the Constitution shields certain persons detained in the U.S. campaign
against terrorism. In Hamdi, Stevens joined Scalia to advocate considerable
protection for one post-September 11 detainee; the opinion emphasized that
the detainee was an American citizen. 194 International human rights law
inclines toward full protection of all persons regardless of nationality. 195
Geneva Convention, supra note 24; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
190. See Glendon, supra note 82, at 5 (describing, in a book that details Eleanor
Roosevelt's role in drafting the UDHR, supra note 188, how President Roosevelt "courted"
Arthur Vandenberg and other Republicans by naming them to represent the United States at
the San Francisco Conference); supra text accompanying note 89 (discussing Stevenson's
role).
191. Ferren, supra note 91, at 421 (reprinting a 1949 editorial cartoon so describing
Rutledge); see Rutledge, supra note 100, at 1-2 (espousing for the United Nations the goals
contained in U.S. Const. pmbl.), quoted in supra text accompanying note 100.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12 (setting out opposition by Rutledge and
several others on the Court).
193. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 700 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring); United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment); see supra text accompanying notes 30, 32-35 (discussing these cases).
194. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-79 (2004) (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens,
J., dissenting); see also Amann, supra note 41, at 2099 (discussing Hamdi's subsequent
release after he gave up U.S. citizenship).
195. SeeAmann, supra note 34, at 310 (setting forth international and national
articulations of a "keystone of the fundamental rights tradition," that "[n]o boundary"
confines certain human rights); see also id. at 309-45 (analyzing post-September 11
detention policy and practice against the backdrop of human rights and humanitarian law).
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But Stevens's majority opinion in Rasul made no clear pronouncement on
the substantive rights to be accorded the non-American detainees to whom
the Court extended "the privilege of litigation"; 196 the Court will revisit that
question in its 2005 Term. 197
Justice Stevens has displayed not only an awareness of foreign context,
but also a willingness to examine foreign judgments that partake of U.S.
tradition and experience. Shared values may be found, of course, in any
number of common law countries. Americans helped to draft Germany's
Basic Law and, more recently, the constitutions of Eastern European states
that gained independence with the breakup of the Soviet bloc. 198
Judgments of interest in these and other countries not infrequently are
influenced by international human rights or humanitarian norms-norms
contained in treaties that the United States helped negotiate. Law that may
be called "foreign" or "external" often resonates with the juridical history
and constitutive values of the United States, and is therefore alien neither to
America's legal tradition nor to America's contemporary experience. 199
196. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at
483 n.15 (2004) (Stevens, J.) (quoting the statutory standard for issuance of a habeas writ
and writing that if true, allegations that petitioners who "have engaged neither in combat nor
in acts of terrorism against the United States" suffered protracted detention without charge
"unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States."'). What rights overseas detainees may enjoy remains the subject of
litigation. See EI-Banna v. Bush, 394 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying without
prejudice a motion for preliminary injunction on the ground that Guantdnamo detainees had
shown no imminent threat to their health); O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2005)
(refusing to issue a preliminary injunction against inhumane treatment and transfer without
notice); In re Guantinamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (ruling that
Fifth Amendment due process forbids arbitrary deprivation of detainees' liberty); Khalid v.
Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing detainees' petitions in part on ground
that nonresident aliens seized and held abroad had no rights cognizable in U.S. courts); see
also infra note 197 and accompanying text.
197. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005), granting cert. to review 415 F.3d
33 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting a challenge to the validity of special military commissions
established for the trial of a petitioner alleged to have been Osama bin Laden's personal
driver, and other designated Guantdnamo detainees). Also pending before the Court at this
writing is a request to review recent rulings in the Padilla litigation. See Padilla v. Hanft,
423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005), rev'g 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C.) (ruling in favor of a
habeas petitioner on grounds similar to those advanced in the Scalia-Stevens dissent in
Hamdi), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3275 (Oct. 25, 2005) (No. 05-533).
198. See, e.g., Vicki Jackson, The Early Hours of the Post-World War 11 Model of
Constitutional Federalism: The Warren Court and the World, in Earl Warren and the
Warren Court: Their Legacy in American and Foreign Law (Harry Scheiber ed.,
forthcoming 2006) (describing the drafting of Germany's charter as representative of a new,
"global constitutionalism"); Wojciech Sadurski, Posteommunist Charters of Rights in
Europe and the U.S. Bill of Rights, L. & Contemp. Probs., Spring 2002, at 223, 223-27
(explaining how the U.S. Bill of Rights "served as both a model and anti-model for the
constitutionalization of citizens' rights in the new democracies emerging after the fall of
communism").
199. See Amann, supra note 41, at 2134 n.179 (observing that modem international
humanitarian law derives from codification of laws of war commissioned by President
Abraham Lincoln and drafted by Francis Lieber); Amann, supra note 109, at 823-35
(demonstrating similarities between U.S. norms of constitutional criminal procedure and
foreign and international counterparts); Amann, supra note 184, at 606 (explaining that
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Such law provides evidence of how a civilized nation-state ought to
behave200-to quote Stevens's opinion in Thompson, of "civilized
standards" to which a country that would present itself as global exemplar
ought to be held accountable. 20 1 "Civilization," though a bedrock term of
the law of nations, now tends to be used advisedly in order to avoid any
implied embrace of colonialist adventurism. But Stevens-the product of a
university then steeped in the Adler-Hutchins project of immersing students
in the Great Books of a Western world that stretched from Alexandria to
Aspen 202-has applied the term in an older and more positive sense. As
Stevens wrote of it in Alvarez-Machain, "the civilized world" denotes an
interdependent, transnational polity bounded by a "Rule of Law" that
demands scrutiny of governmental incursions against individual dignity.20 3
The dignitary interests at the core of Stevens's view of the Bill of Rights are
manifest as well in what are called international human rights.204 Evidence
of such commonality enhances Stevens's attention to a foreign source, just
as evidence of an absence of shared values will lead him to disregard it.
"calling a cited norm 'external,' though a convenient rhetorical feint, is a misnomer"); cf
Ferren, supra note 91, at 56 (finding in "renowned Columbia University professor" Lieber,
"a Prussian-born scholar who had become the nation's first full-time law professor," "some
roots of the eventual judicial philosophy of Wiley Rutledge").
200. Cf Jackson, supra note 198 (attributing the Court's postwar jurisprudence not only
to a Cold War dynamic, but also to an acknowledgment of "a broader world of 'civilized'
behavior, some of whose protections for criminal defendants apparently exceeded our
own").
201. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.);
accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002) (opinion for the Court) (Stevens, J.)
(reciting statements of dissenters below that in refusing to consider the effects of mental
retardation on culpability, "[a] moral and civilized society diminishes itself') (quoting
Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 325 (Va. 2000) (Koontz, J., dissenting)).
202. See Stevens, supra note 62, at 1561 (recalling the dispute between the famed
University of Chicago professors "who taught the Great Books class"); John Paul Stevens,
The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 277, 278-81 (1986) [hereinafter Stevens,
Liberty] (setting out Adler's taxonomy of liberty). See generally Great Books of the Western
World (Robert M. Hutchins et al. eds., 1952) (fifty-four volume anthology of works by
authors ranging from Aeschylus to Virginia Woolf).
203. "I suspect most courts throughout the civilized world," Stevens wrote, "will be
deeply disturbed by the 'monstrous' decision the Court announces today. For every nation
that has an interest in preserving the Rule of Law is affected, directly, or indirectly, by a
decision of this character." United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 687-88 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 371 (1824) (Story, J.));
see supra text accompanying notes 31, 36-39 (discussing Alvarez-Machain).
204. Stevens, Liberty, supra note 202, at 284 (approving of the "simple proposition" that
"a burden on the individual interest in equal respect and equal treatment may constitute an
arbitrary deprivation of liberty without any inquiry into the procedures that accompanied the
deprivation," and adding that "[o]ne of the elements of liberty is the right to be respected as
a human being"); see John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 13, 37 (1992) (embracing the statement that "'[t]hose who won our
independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties' (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)); see also Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury:
Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1921, 1931-
41 (2003) (analyzing the emergence of dignity as a legal concept in the last half of the
twentieth century).
1604 [Vol. 74
2006] JOHN PA UL STEVENS, HUMAN RIGHTS JUDGE
Examination of Stevensean jurisprudence, in short, exposes no automatic
acceptance of foreign practice. It reveals instead a Justice constrained by
his understanding of American constitutional values, yet receptive to
judgments by colleagues whose thoughtfulness and commitment to
fundamental rights merit his respectful consideration.
CONCLUSION
John Paul Stevens came of age in the middle of the twentieth century, at
a time when the United States emerged as a world leader. As a Navy
officer in World War II, Stevens learned firsthand some of the
responsibility that came with that global status. His awareness of the role
of the United States in the world was sustained throughout his law studies,
his clerkship for Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, his years in the practice, and his
service as an Article III judge. It is little surprise that Justice Stevens has
extended some constitutional protections beyond U.S. borders, or that he
has explained his willingness to consult the work of foreign jurists in these
terms of mutual respect: "[I]f we expect them to listen to us, we should at
least be willing to listen to what they have to say." 20 5 Stevens's mid-
century experiences reinforced that much of what "they" have to say is not
truly foreign, because the postwar human rights treaties or constitutions
they interpret are progeny of America's fundamental rights tradition. It is
to the extent that foreign sources confirm American values of liberty and
equality that the Justice has looked to such sources. And it is because
human rights embrace those values that Stevens is, indeed, a human rights
judge.
205. Stevens, supra note 58, at 9.
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